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ABSTRACT
The Defense-in-Depth (DiD) theory has been accepted by most information
security specialists and has been adopted by the Department of Defense (DOD) as a
general methodology for improving any organization's information security posture.
However, none of today’s information technology (IT) audit frameworks incorporate all
aspects of the DiD theory (National Security Agency, n.d.).
Banks and other financial institutions are, according to regulations, required to
develop an IT audit program to support their respective IT infrastructure, to keep nonpublic customer information secure, and to conduct a risk-based audit on an annual basis
(FDIC, 2000). The regulatory prescribed audit can be conducted either internally or
externally. Whether the institution is conducting an internal IT audit or is contracting
with an external firm to complete the audit, the question remains the same—how to
complete the IT audit successfully.
Because regulators provide little or no guidance to financial institutions, it is
difficult to prepare for IT audits. Of the available frameworks, none are customized to
provide feedback for both, adequacy and compliance, and none includes the human
factors of auditing.
The purpose of this study is to develop a holistic IT audit framework that
incorporates the important DiD theory and is customized for small- and medium-sized
financial institutions. The newly created framework is based on commonly accepted
information security practices, federal regulations, current IT audit frameworks, and has
been validated using the design science methodology.

Furthermore, implementation

using a multiple case study has been completed, and the results have been analyzed. This
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research is significant as very little empirical data is available in the IT audit field. The
framework is one of the first of its kind to illustrate a blueprint of a risk-based IT audit
for small- and medium-sized financial institutions. Portions of this research have been
further validated in academic journals and peer-reviewed conference proceedings.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The Information Technology Audit (IT audit) Program Booklet, The Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), states that a well-structured IT audit
program is critical for the evaluation of management practices, internal control, and,
finally, compliance with bank policy regarding IT. Furthermore, the audit program
should be risk-based, promote critical controls, ensure that recommendations are
addressed in a timely manner, and keep the Board of Directors current on risk
management efforts. Ensuring a sound risk-based IT audit program and audit function
may reduce the time examiners spend reviewing regulatory compliance of the bank.
Finally, depending on the size and complexity of the institution, the IT audit program
should ideally be a continuous process of internal review, coupled with an annual wellstructured external IT audit (FFIEC, 2008).
The FFIEC IT Audit Handbook also sets forth certain requirements that a sound,
risk-based audit should include. Some of the handbook’s core ideas include that
institutions must identify assets and develop a method for identifying the risks to each IT
asset. This method should promote confidentiality, integrity and, finally availability.
Furthermore, the IT Audit should also cover management activities and evaluate the
adequacy of both policy and controls implemented by the bank.
Banks and other financial institutions are, according to regulations, required to
develop an IT audit program to support its IT infrastructure, to keep non-public customer
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information secure, and to conduct a risk-based audit on an annual basis (FDIC, 2000).
This audit can be conducted either internally or externally. Whether the institution is
conducting an internal IT audit or is contracting for it externally, the question remains the
same—how to complete the IT audit successfully.
Because regulators provide little or no guidance to financial institutions, it is
difficult to prepare for IT audits. Of the models on the market today, none is customized
to provide feedback for both, adequacy and compliance, and none includes the human
factors of auditing. Human factor auditing is a method an auditor may use to gain access
to sensitive areas or information, also called social engineering. This method tests the
employees to ensure knowledge of policies and procedures, and can provide critical
training to ensure Information Assurance (IA). A framework that combines these will
increase the bank’s important information security posture. Through research, several
other general issues have emerged with any type of audit, not simply IT audits. The most
common concern is insufficient information when evidence is gathered to make adequate
recommendations. Any organization should pay special attention to audit trails and, in
particular, electronic records created by IT systems, such as system logs. These should be
prioritized and stored appropriately as they become extremely important when
conducting an IT audit (Burnelli, 2004).
The second most common audit issue deals with framework design errors, e.g.,
the auditor’s failure to accurately calculate the inherent risk and adjust the audit program
accordingly (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, Spring 2009).
Most risk-based audits are heavily based on policies and procedures or network
auditing. The National Security Agency (NSA) published a strategy called ―Defense-in-
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Depth (DiD)‖ that outlines the ―best practices‖ for IA (See Figure 1). It integrates
people, operations, and technology capabilities to establish IA protection across multiple
layers and dimensions. A hacker, who attempts to penetrate or break down one security
barrier, encounters these additional layers of defense, Defense-In-Depth (National
Security Agency, n.d.). DiD is considered by most experts as a ―best practice‖ for
information security, and has been incorporated into various information security fields,
such as network protection (Kelly, 2006).

Figure 1: Defense-In-Depth
Purpose of Study
The DiD framework has been accepted by most information security specialists
and has been adapted by the Department of Defense (DOD) as a general methodology for
improving any organization's information security posture. However, none of today’s IT
Audit frameworks incorporates all aspects of the DiD strategy (National Security
Agency, n.d.).
The purpose of this study is to develop a holistic IT audit framework that
incorporates this important DiD concept. Furthermore, to develop such a framework,
three research steps have been developed:
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1.

Identify shortcomings of existing IT audit frameworks, in particular, relating to
small- and medium-sized financial institutions.

2.

Develop a holistic risk-based IT audit framework, incorporating Defense-inDepth, specifically designed for small- and medium-sized financial institution,
based on current research and methods. (See Figure 1.)

3.

Test and evaluate the artifact.

Requirements
The research has some inherent requirements to allow it to be designed
specifically for small- and medium-sized financial institutions (SMEFIs). The framework
has to:
1.

Follow the Defense-In-Depth concept, including the following key areas: people,
technology, and operations.

2.

Comply with regulatory requirements.

3.

Incorporate both, adequacy and compliance.

4.

Utilize existing research and methodologies.

5.

Suggest improvements in the development of the holistic IT Audit framework.

The success of this study will be determined through case studies and focus groups, as
discussed in the Methodology section.
This concludes the introduction to the research on the development of the holistic
information technology audit framework. Chapter 2 will deal with the regulatory
requirements of Information Assurance and also identifies existing frameworks and their
shortcomings.
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Key Terms/Glossary
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
FFIEC
IT
IA
NSA
DiD
DOD
IS
CIA
EDP
CIS
ISACA
CISA
ISO 27001
BFS
FDIC
FRB
NCAU
OCC
OTS

Infosec Triangle
RBA
CSO

COSO ERM
COBIT

ISMS
SMEFI
SOX
GLBA
VA
PT
ISP
IDS
ISO
SE

Information Technology
Information Assurance
National Security Agency
Defense-in-Depth
Department of Defense
Information Security
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
Electronic Data Processing
Computer Information Systems
Information Systems Audit and Control Association
Certified Information Systems Auditor
International Organization for Standardization
Banking and Financial Sector
Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation
Federal Reserve Board
National Credit Union Administration
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Office of Thrift Supervision
Information Security triangle is commonly accepted as the perception
model for analyzing, managing, and auditing information security
Risk-Based Auditing
Chief Security Officer
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework, published in 2004
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology
Information Security Management System
Small- and Medium-Sized Financial Institution
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Vulnerability Assessment
Penetration Testing
Information Security Program
Intrusion Detection System
Information Security Officer
Social Engineering
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
Information Assurance
The term Information Assurance (IA) is often used interchangeably with the term
Information Security (IS). IA actually dates back to World War II, when the first modern
computers were created and utilized to develop code-breaking computations. The initial
purpose of these machines was to crack the codes from the powerful Enigma machine,
developed by the Germans. The computer equipment had to be protected from physical
threats. Access controls such as facial recognition, badges, and keys were utilized for
these areas, hence the term computer security. IA, on the other hand, was not quite as
complex, and usually simply involved document classifications. Obviously, there were
no application security requirements during this period, leading to the focus of physical
security against sabotage, espionage, and the likes (Johnson, 2005).
IA has since then developed into a greater area and takes into consideration three
levels of asset protection–Confidentiality, Integrity, and, finally, Availability (CIA).
According to John McCumber, ―the primary consideration for confidentiality is not
simply keeping information secret from everyone else; it is making it available only to
those who need it, when they need it, and under appropriate circumstances.‖ Integrity is
critical, ensuring that accurate information is always available. In other words, integrity
provides the ―accuracy and robustness of data.‖ Finally, availability represents the
timeliness of data. If data is unreachable when needed, it is simply not available.
Availability is often seen by organizations as an afterthought, as a demand for
redundancy and uptime requirements (McCumber, 2005).
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Information Technology Auditing – Basics
As with Information Assurance, Information Technology Auditing is considered a
relatively new discipline. However, much has changed as it relates to its importance of
IT auditing from several key incidents in history. Because of financial fiascos such as
Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing, as well as the events of September 11, 2001,
every industry has come to realize that IT auditing has become crucial in ensuring the
integrity of information systems. ―The need to control and audit IT has never been
greater.‖ (Gallegos, Sneft, Manson, & Gonzales, 2004).
Electronic Data Processing (EDP), Computer Information Systems (CIS) auditing,
and Information Systems (IS) auditing have all become parts of IT auditing.
Furthermore, each is considered an extension of traditional auditing. The initial need for
IT auditing comes from several areas, among them auditors’ realization that computers
and information systems are critical, and valuable to businesses. Furthermore,
professional organizations and government agencies realized that there was a need for IT
controls, as well as for auditing those controls (Gallegos, Sneft, Manson, & Gonzales,
2004).
Initially, auditing components were taken from internal controls and information
systems management that provide methodologies necessary to implement and design
information systems (Gallegos, Sneft, Manson, & Gonzales, 2004).
From these early stages, IT auditing has evolved into a profession with conduct,
aims, and qualities that are characterized by worldwide standards, as well as ethical rules
as defined by ISACA. Professionals can also seek certifications, such as Certified
Information Systems Auditor (CISA) (Gallegos, Sneft, Manson, & Gonzales, 2004).
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The breadth and extensive knowledge required to perform IT audits are various
and many. A few examples may be:


Implementing and conducting risk-oriented audit approaches



Applications of standards, such as ISO 27002



Business understanding



Assessment of information security and privacy issues that can impose risk for an
organization



Legal and regulatory requirements



Management reporting and follow-up (Sayana, 2002).
Information systems have significant meaning to every organization. In the past,

computer systems were seen as merely a way to record business transactions. Today
information systems drive key aspects of the organization. The main purpose of
information systems auditing is to review and provide feedback, assurances, and
suggestions to the organization regarding its information security posture. These topics
can be grouped into the McCumber cube’s CIA:
1.

Confidentiality: Will critical information on systems only be disclosed to authorized
personnel?

2.

Availability: Will critical business systems be available at all times when they are
required to be? How well are these systems protected against all types of threats,
e.g., disasters and losses?

3.

Integrity: Will information on critical systems always be accurate, reliable and
timely? What controls are in place to prevent unauthorized modification to the
software, information, or databases? (Sayana, 2002).

9

As mentioned, information systems are more than just simply computers. They
are complex systems and include several components that make up the business solution.
An auditor can only give assurance about an information system if all of the components
are evaluated and secured by the organization. Within any IT audit, the weakest link
during the audit process is the total strength of the overall audit process.
Industry-Specific Background Information (Banking and Financial Sector)
The events of September 11, 2001, have brought attention to several security
issues that make the United States vulnerable to a host of attacks. Over 85% of the
critical infrastructure and assets are not owned by the federal government, but rather by
the private sector (Dan, 2003). Information assurance is a pivotal factor to secure critical
infrastructures and assets, so much so that former President Clinton identified a national
goal to secure these national private-sector information assets and infrastructures in
Presidential Decision Directive 63. It identifies eight key sectors that are extremely
vulnerable to attack, including Telecommunications, Electrical Power Systems, Gas and
Oil Storage and Transportation, Banking and Finance, Water Supply Systems,
Transportation, Emergency Services, and Continuity of Government (Clinton, 1998).
Another publication, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, outlines
specific requirements to what each sector is responsible for. The Department of the
Treasury is the government body that is responsible for protecting the critical banking
and financial sector. The Banking and Financial Sector (BFS) accounts for nearly eight
percent of the US annual gross domestic product and is considered a backbone for the
world economy. As terrorism and malicious attacks become more common, the BFS
sector is a high-value and symbolic target. Furthermore, protection is also needed for
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power outages, natural disasters. With increasing concern, flu pandemics must also be
taken into consideration when protecting such a critical asset to our nation. Protecting
the BFS means cooperation between financial regulators and private sector owners and
operators. The goal is to ensure the safety and soundness of this industry by developing
programs that provide protection. Furthermore, this coalition continuously improves
these programs to include current and new threats to the banking and financial sector
(Banking and Finance - Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as
input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2007).
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) is a formal
interagency body and is a part of the cooperation that is in charge of protecting the
banking and financial sector. Its purpose is to develop and design standards, develop
uniform principles, and report forms for federal examinations. The FFIEC is a body of
regulators from the Federal Reserve Board (FDR), Federal Deposit and Insurance
Cooperation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). The
FFIEC’s main goal is to promote uniformity in the supervision of the banking and
financial sector. In an effort to develop a standard, the FFIEC has published the FFIEC
InfoBase Handbook. This handbook is used to provide financial institutions with
guidelines on Information Technology and Information Security, and is the basis for any
IT examination. The Handbook incorporates a broad area of topics, including: Audit,
Business Continuity Planning, Development and Acquisition, Information Security, and
E-Banking (Greene, 2006).
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In the Information Technology Audit Program Booklet, the FFIEC states that a
well-structured IT audit program is critical for the evaluation of management practices,
internal control, and, finally, compliance with bank policy regarding IT. Furthermore,
the audit program should be risk-based, promote critical controls, ensure that
recommendations are addressed in a timely manner, and keep the Board of Directors
current on its risk management efforts. Ensuring a sound risk-based IT audit program
and audit function may reduce the time examiners spend on reviewing certain areas of the
bank. Finally, depending on the size and complexity of the institution, the IT audit
program should ideally be a continuous process of internal review, coupled with an
annual well-structured external IT audit (FFIEC, 2008).
The FFIEC IT Handbook also documents that a sound, risk-based audit should
include and cover the following areas:


Identify areas of greatest IT risk exposure to the institution in order to focus
audit resources;



Promote the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems;



Determine the effectiveness of management’s planning and oversight of IT
activities;



Evaluate the adequacy of operating processes and internal controls;



Determine the adequacy of enterprise-wide compliance efforts related to IT
policies and internal control procedures; and



Require appropriate corrective action to address deficient internal controls and
follow up to ensure that management promptly and effectively implements the
required actions. (FFIEC, 2008)
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Banks and other financial institutions are, according to regulations, required to
develop an information technology audit program to support its information technology
infrastructure, to keep non-public customer information secure, and to conduct a riskbased audit on an annual basis (FDIC, 2000). This audit can be conducted either
internally or externally. Whether the institution is conducting an internal IT audit or is
contracting for it externally, the question remains the same—how to complete the IT
audit successfully.
Because regulators provide little or no guidance to financial institutions, it is
difficult to prepare for IT audits. Of the IT audit models on the market today, none is
customized to provide feedback for both, adequacy and compliance, and none includes
human factors of auditing, particularly aimed toward small- and medium-sized financial
institutions. A framework that combines these will increase the bank’s important
information security posture. Through research, several general problems have emerged
with any type of audit, not simply IT audits. The most common one is that the auditor is
not gathering enough evidence to make adequate recommendations. Any organization
should pay special attention to audit trails and, in particular, electronic records created by
IT systems, such as system logs. These should be prioritized and stored appropriately as
they become extremely important when conducting an IT audit (Burnelli, 2004).
The second most common audit issue is that the framework used has design
errors, more specifically, that the auditors failed to accurately calculate the inherent risk
and adjust the audit program accordingly (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, Spring
2009).
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The breath and extensive knowledge required to perform IT audits are various and
many. A few examples may be:


Implementing and conducting risk-oriented audit approaches



Applications of standards such as ISO 27002



Business understanding



Assessment of information security and privacy issues that can impose risk on an
organization



Legal and regulatory requirements



Management reporting and follow up (Sayana, 2002).
Several articles and papers have been written about information security,

including management and IT audits. IT auditing is, generally speaking, similar to more
conventional audits that are more nontechnical, and is based on a risk assessment model.
Most information security management and IT audits are generally based on the Infosec
Triangle (Singleton T. W., 2007)—confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA),
considered to be the most commonly protected characteristics of information assets.
Some models have additional terms added to these three. The Infosec model is
commonly accepted as the perception model for analyzing, managing, and auditing
information security (Singleton T. W., 2007).
ISACA has outlined some broad major components of the information systems
auditing classification:
1.

Physical and environmental review: This includes physical security, power supply,
air conditioning, humidity control, and other environmental factors.
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2.

System administration review: This includes security review of the operating
systems, database management systems, all system administration procedures and
compliance.

3.

Application software review: The business application could be payroll, invoicing, a
web-based customer order processing system or an enterprise resource planning
system that actually runs the business. Review of such application software includes
access control and authorizations, validations, error and exception handling,
business process flows within the application software and complementary manual
controls and procedures. Additionally, a review of the system development life
cycle should be completed.

4.

Network security review: Some typical areas of coverage are review of internal and
external connections to the system, perimeter security, firewall review, router access
control lists, port scanning and intrusion detection.

5.

Business continuity review: This includes the existence and maintenance of fault
tolerant and redundant hardware, backup procedures and storage, and a documented
and tested disaster recovery/business continuity plan.

6.

Data integrity review: The purpose of this is scrutiny of live data to verify adequacy
of controls and impact of weaknesses, as noticed in any of the above reviews. Such
substantive testing can be done using generalized audit software, e.g., computer
assisted audit techniques (Sayana, 2002).
According to Sayana, these six elements will need to be adequately addressed and

presented to management to achieve a clear and complete assessment of the system.
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For example, application software may be well designed and implemented with
all the security features, but the default super-user password in the operating
system used on the server may not have been changed, thereby allowing someone
to access the data files directly. Such a situation negates whatever security is built
into the application. Likewise, firewalls and technical system security may have
been implemented very well, but the role definitions and access controls within
the application software may have been so poorly designed and implemented that
by using their user IDs, employees may get to see critical and sensitive
information far beyond their roles. (Sayana, 2002)

Furthermore, it is important to realize that different audits may involve all of these
steps to some degree. Some audits may only analyze one of the elements outlined, while
others will drop some of them. However, the fact remains that they all need to be
addressed, though it is not mandatory to do all of them in one audit, as the skills required
by the auditor in each step may be different. Though they may be performed at different
times, it is also important to understand that the result of each step has to be looked at by
management as a relationship, ensuring that a complete view of the issues and problems
is adequately presented (Sayana, 2002).
As more traditional audit methods are usually regarded as a controls review, a
new method has surfaced—Risk-Based Auditing (RBA). That means that regulators are
responsible for much more, including evaluating the value of the information technology
audit function as it relates to specific functions, such as the institution’s ability to report
and detect important risk factors to the Board of Directors as well as to senior
management (Patel, 2006).
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There is clearly a need for RBA, as most organizations utilize a number of
different information systems. These may have different applications for various
functions and activities. Furthermore, computer systems may be installed at different
geographical locations. Usually, the auditor is left with questions on what, when, and
how often to conduct an audit. The answers to these questions are to deploy an RBA
approach (Griffiths, 2006).
Risk-based IT auditing is an approach that focuses on analyzing risk applicable to
the business. More precisely,
[It] is an approach that focuses on the response of the organization to the risks it
faces in achieving its goals and objectives. Unlike other forms of audit, Risk
Based Auditing starts with business objectives and their associated risks rather
than the need for controls. It aims to give independent assurance that risks are
being managed to an acceptable level and to facilitate improvements where
necessary (Arun District Council, 2009)

Every information system has some form of inherent risks. These will have a
different impact on the systems in various ways. There are four short steps in developing
an RBA audit plan:
1.

Take an inventory of the information systems in use by the organization and
categorize them.

2.

Determine which of the systems affects critical functions or assets, such as money,
materials, customers, decision making, and how close to real time they operate.

3.

Assess what risks affect these systems and the severity of impact on the business.

17
4.

Rank the systems based on the above assessment and decide the audit priority,
resources, schedule, and frequency. (Griffiths, 2006)
Based on these four steps, an auditor can develop an annual audit plan that

outlines the audits to be performed during the calendar year, taking into consideration the
schedule and resources required.
Risk-based internal auditing (RBIA) is considered the methodology utilized by
the internal audit department to ensure that risks are being managed and that the residual
risk falls within appropriate levels. Risk-based auditing ensures that the organization is
within its acceptable level of risk after controls are put into place. The Board of
Directors in any organization is ultimately responsible for this acceptable risk level
(Griffiths, 2006).
According to Griffiths, in order for any risk-based audit framework to be
implemented successfully in an organization, the Board of Directors and upper
management must ensure that the institution has, through a risk assessment process,
identified all risks and implemented all controls for each asset. When controls have been
applied and fall within the acceptable risk level as approved, the risk assessment process
is complete. Ensuring a comprehensive risk-management process is critical to any
organization, and will define the responsibilities of management, external audit
processes, internal audit, and any other functions that provide assurance (Griffiths, 2006).
As it relates to external auditing, a risk-based audit will also require that auditors
completely understand their clients, their clients’ industry, the nature of their business
and the environment they operate in. ―Without a thorough understanding, the auditor may
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fail to correctly identify the critical business process and corresponding internal controls
that he should evaluate‖ (Hunton, Bryant, & Bagranoff, 2004).
Risk-based auditing extends and improves the risk assessment process by looking
at areas based on risk instead of focusing on controls (McNamee, 1997). By focusing on
high risk areas, the auditor must also understand that ―some activities might never be
deemed important enough to receive internal audit attention‖ because they are considered
low risk areas (Parkinson, 2004).
The risk-based audit methodology is relatively new, and it greatly differs from
more traditional audit approaches. Table 1 outlines these differences (Lindow & Race,
2002).

Table 1: Traditional vs. Risk-Based Audit Approach
Traditional
Audit focus
Transaction-based
Financial account focus
Compliance objective

Risk-Based
Business focus
Process-based
Customer focus
Risk identification, process improvement objective

Policies and procedures focus
Multi-year audit coverage
Policy adherence
Budgeted cost center

Risk management focus
Continual risk-reassessment coverage
Change facilitator
Accountability for performance improvement
results

Career auditors
Methodology: Focus on policies, transactions
and compliance

Opportunities for other management positions
Methodology: Focus on goals, strategies, and risk
management processes

Banks and financial institutions are required to conduct an annual RBA. If an
institution is not compliant, the Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can
shut the bank down (Rothman, 2007). The FFIEC has outlined the following
requirements for an RBA audit:
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Identify the institution’s data, application and operating systems,
technology, facilities, and personnel;



Identify the business activities and processes within each of those
categories;



Include profiles of significant business units, departments, product lines,
or systems, and their associated business risks and control features,
resulting in a document describing the structure of risk and controls
throughout the institution;



Use a measurement or scoring system that ranks and evaluates business
and control risks for significant business units, departments, and products;



Include board or audit committee approval of risk assessments and annual
risk-based audit plans that establish audit schedules, audit cycles, work
program scope, and resource allocation for each area audited;



Implement the audit plan through planning, execution, reporting, and
follow-up; and



Include a process that regularly monitors the risk assessment and updates
it at least annually for all significant business units, departments, and
products or systems. (FFIEC, 2008)

Defense-in-Depth
As stated previously, Information Assurance is so much more than simply
computer systems. Reality is that IA is the sum of the total methods of the protection of
people, process, and technology. As proven with research, there is no ―silver bullet‖ for
IA— no single method or technology will make a single asset or information safe from

20

internal or external threats. A layered defense approach is needed, better known as
Defense-in-Depth (DiD). The National Security Agency (NSA) published the DiD
framework that outlines the ―best practices‖ for information assurance. It integrates
people, operations, and technology capabilities to establish information assurance (IA)
protection across multiple layers and dimensions (See Figure 2). Several layers of
defense will cause a hacker who attempts to penetrate or break down one security barrier
to encounter another layer of defense, called Defense-in-Depth (National Security
Agency, n.d). DiD is considered by most experts as a ―best practice‖ for information
security, and has been incorporated into different information security fields, such as
network protection (Kelly, 2006).

Figure 2: Defense-In-Depth
People are often considered the most critical asset of protection to any
organization, and therefore play a crucial role in the DiD framework, as people are
generally considered the ―first line of defense.‖ Protecting the information assets in any
organization begins at the people aspect of the DiD framework, usually with the Chief
Information Officer. The CIO must have a clear understanding of what is being protected
against what threats. This knowledge must be clearly communicated in information
security policies and procedures, as well as assignments of roles and responsibilities.
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This includes training of personnel (National Security Agency, n.d.). Figure 3 gives an
example of topics that would be included in the People aspect of the DiD theory.

Training
and
Awareness

Policies
and
Procedures

System
Security
Physical
Security

People

Personnel
Security

Figure 3: Defense-in-Depth (People)

In today’s highly networked society, there is an abundance of technologies
providing information assurance for detecting intrusions. Because there is a vast
selection of potential products, it is important that the organization has the right methods
for selecting and implementing these technologies. This can be done through policies
and processes such as configuration (National Security Agency, n.d.). Figure 4 explains
the Technology aspect of the DiD Theory.
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Defend the
Computing
Environment
Defend the
Network and
Infrastructure

Support the
Infrastructure

Technology

Figure 4: Defense-in-Depth (Technology)
Finally, the operations layer in the DiD model provides assurance on the
organization’s daily information security posture. This layer includes enforcement of the
policies as well as ways of recovery from incidents as they happen. Emergency
preparedness testing is one of the things an organization has to do to ensure readiness
(National Security Agency, n.d.). Figure 5 outlines the Operations aspect of the DiD
theory.

Security
Management
Certification
and
Accreditation

Security
Policy

Recovery

Operations

Readiness
Assessment

Figure 5: Defense-In-Depth (Operations)
Industry experts recognize DiD as one of the most acceptable and best
frameworks to ensure Information Assurance. One expert is quoted as stating that
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―enough emphasis cannot be applied to the importance of a defense-in-depth
methodology to the overall security within an organization. This effort should be
championed by the company’s CSO (or an equal role), and a series of steps should be
defined to ensure that the methodology is carried out throughout all tiers within the
organization‖ (National Security Agency, n.d.). Because of the acceptance of this
framework in industry, the following audit models currently in place will be measured
against this concept.
Current Frameworks
The financial sector has very specific regulatory guidelines for conducting an
information technology audit (Beaumier, 2007). Several standards can be utilized to
assist in complying with these standards. Even if an organization has more than one
regulator to comply with, standards, such as the ISO 27002, will help compliance with
these regulations (Greene, 2006). Because guidance from regulators is scarce, audit
frameworks can be utilized to conduct the IT audit. Some of the most accredited
frameworks on the market are the COSO ERM framework, COBIT, and ISO 27002 Code
of Practice. Although none of these frameworks is identical, some key areas that must be
addressed, and are a part of all frameworks (Beaumier, 2007):


Board of director and senior management oversight



Risk identification and assessment



The compliance organization itself



Policies and procedures



A system of internal controls



Training
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Self-monitoring and remediation



Customer complaint process



Reporting and record keeping



Board of directors and management reporting

ISO 27002, Code of Practice
The ISO 27002 is considered a widely recognized Information Security
framework. It consists of eleven domain areas, 39 control objectives, and 133 controls.
The ISO guidelines are considered to be an international standard for ―best practices‖ for
Information Security, and are the minimum baseline for controls that all information
security programs should address in some way, depending on the size and complexity of
the organization (Carlson, 2008).
It is important to note that the ISO 27002 is not a technical standard, nor is it
product and technology driven. Finally, it is not considered an evaluation method for any
equipment (Carlson, 2008). It has two stages of the audit process: Stage 1:
Documentation Review; Stage 2: Implementation Audit.
ISO 27002 is based on the development of an Information Security Management
System (ISMS)—on an organization’s policies, procedures, plans, processes, practices,
roles and responsibilities, resources, and, finally, structures used to protect and maintain
confidentiality of information. An ISMS does further include all of the processes an
organization uses to manage and control its information security risks, and is essentially a
part of a larger management system (Praxiom, 2009).
The purpose of an ISO 27002 Audit is to check compliance as it relates to the
following criteria:
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The organization’s Security Policies and Procedures



Customer and Contract Requirements



Legal Requirements (regulatory requirements etc.)



The documented Information Security Management System



Organizational standards



ISO 27002 Compliance (Zhu, 2007)
The SANS Institute has developed an IT Audit checklist for the ISO 27002

framework (SANS, 2006). This checklist can be used to perform a compliance audit for
the ISO 27002 framework. In other words, an ISO 27002 audit is simply a compliance
audit for documentation in place at the organization (SANS, 2006).
As it relates to SMEFIs, the ISO 27002 framework in general complies fully with
the FFIEC documentation requirements. It is not risk-based, as it simply checks for
policy controls, and does not rate the importance of each control. Furthermore, an ISO
audit is simply done for certification purposes. As mentioned earlier, the ISO 27002 is
not technology driven, and therefore leaves out a critical aspect of the Defense-In-Depth
methodology.
COSO ERM Framework
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) is a nonprofit organization that in 1992 developed a definition for internal
control. COSO created a framework that laid out methods for evaluating internal controls
for organizations. After Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002,
requiring all public organizations to evaluate its internal controls, several organizations
have adopted COSO to evaluate these internal controls.
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Although SOX was intended for publicly traded companies, several privately
owned organizations as well as nonprofit organizations have adopted the COSO
framework. The way it is implemented in an organization depends on its size and
complexity (Pullen, 2009).
According to COSO, there are three primary objectives of an internal control
approach. The internal control system is to ensure: (1) efficient and effective operations,
(2) accurate financial reporting, and (3) compliance with laws and regulations. The report
also outlines five essential components of an effective internal control system:


Control Environment contains the critical integrity and ethical values of the
organization. The control environment includes the organization’s code of ethics,
as well as the Board of Directors’ oversight and actions and how they affect the
integrity and ethical values of the company, including its code of conduct,
involvement of the Board of Directors and other actions that set the tone of the
organization.



Risk Assessment, the second component, is considered the process that
management is utilizing to identify potential threats and how those risks are
addressed by the organization. Not having a risk management process in place
could potentially result in misstatements in the organization’s financial
statements.



Control Activities are generally considered as internal controls, and include
segregation of duties and information processing controls.



Information and Communication is considered the internal and external
reporting process, such as how information is presented to other vendors and
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potential clients. This usually also includes an evaluation of the organization’s
technology environment, such as a vulnerability assessment and penetration test.


Finally, Monitoring is essentially the auditing aspect of the COSO framework
and includes a quality assessment of the organization’s internal controls, as well
as assurance that the organization continues to address new and upcoming risks
associated to the organization. (Applegate & Willis, 1999)
These five components are usually utilized to integrate COSO into any auditing

framework and by doing so, create a structure to the audit process. Dennis Applegate
and Ted Wills (1999) state in an article published by the Institute of Internal Auditors that
the idea of COSO auditing is to focus on one of the three COSO objectives at the time.
By focusing on only compliance will allow the auditor to better determine the audit focus
and ensure effectiveness of the implemented controls (Applegate & Willis, 1999).
Prior to the COSO framework, more traditional theories focused on financial
controls. The COSO framework covers the financial aspect as well, but broadens this to
include a more enterprise-wide view. COSO considers the evaluation of segregation of
duties (hard controls) as well as soft controls, such as employee competence and
professionalism (Simmons, 1997).
Implementing COSO in an organization is not a simple task. Utilizing the
framework will leave the auditor to rely heavily on the reviews of policies and procedures
to ensure that the audit complies with the framework. The goal of a COSO audit is to
ensure that the organization and its management have in place appropriate internal
controls and ensure a strategic view. The process extends through monitoring and
decisions relating to financial reporting and internal control. In addition, the auditor will
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balance the audit findings and make a final overall evaluation that outlines the level of
risk in the five areas of the COSO model. Even within the model, strengths in certain
elements may mitigate weaknesses in other elements (Singleton T. , 2008). Furthermore,
there is

no defined approach to auditing ―soft‖ controls such as integrity and ethical

values of employees and the approach management makes as it relates to the operation of
the organization. In fact, experts have said that implementing COSO and customizing it
to fit the organization have taken up to four years of hard work and research until a
formal methodology was reached (Simmons, 1997).
Implementing the COSO framework can also have benefits to the organization,
specifically in these five areas:
Effectiveness: Auditing all five components of COSO will ensure a baseline as it
relates to the degree of assurance of the implemented controls.
Efficiency: Focusing on only one of the three COSO objectives at a time can
ensure that the audit is not affected by the costly ―scope creep‖.
Comparability: Because COSO is intended for large and complex organizations,
and by utilizing its framework throughout the organization, it enables the
organization to compare controls in different business segments.
Communication: By explaining and using the COSO during discussions with
organizations, it increases the client’s understanding and knowledge of the control
objectives.
Audit Committee: Reports based on the COSO framework help the auditor to
portray strengths and weaknesses in the internal control system to the
organization. (Applegate & Willis, 1999)
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COBIT
Control Objective for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) is a
framework consisting of controls and standards published by the Information Systems
Audit and Control Association (ISACA). The COBIT framework contains 34 processes
as well as 220 low-level control objectives. It is intended as an IT Governance
framework that establishes what an organization should do as it relates to IT governance
(Meycor COBIT, n.d). Experts claim that one of the main reasons COBIT has been
adopted by so many organizations internationally is that it deals with every aspect of IT
(Financial Services Technology, 2009). The intent of information technology governance
and the aim behind COBIT is to ensure that information technology and organizational
needs are met and that information technology extends the organization’s strategies and
objectives (Martin, 2008). COBIT contains the following four core areas:


Control Objectives: There very high-level generic statements of minimum good
controls in an organization. A total of 220 of these control objectives split
between 34 processes.



Control Practices: This area contains explanations of why a certain control
objective should be in place. Control practices also outline how the control
objectives can be implemented.



Audit Guidelines: They give guidance for each of the 34 processes on how the
auditor can gain an understanding of the controls. The Audit guidelines also
outline how the auditor can evaluate each control, as well as measure compliance
and develop the residual risk if controls are not adequately implemented.
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Management Guidelines: These provide guidance on how to assess and improve
IT process performance, using maturity models, metrics, and critical success
factors. (Kowal, n.d)

The COBIT Framework is outlined in Figure 6.

Business
Requirenments

Information
Criteria
Information
Processes

COBIT

•
•
•
•
•

Effectiveness
Efficiency
CIA
Compliance
Reliability

IT Resources
•
•
•
•

Applications
Information
Infrastructure
Personnel

Figure 6: COBIT
Within COBIT, ISACA has published some general audit guidelines that generate
a simple high-level structure, allowing for the review of the organization’s processes and
measuring them against COBIT. There are four goals of the COBIT Audit process:


The auditor must gain an understanding of the organization’s business
requirements and associated risks and understand relevant controls.



The second process contains the evaluation of the appropriate controls as well as
the documented controls.
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The auditor must also assess the compliance of all controls to ensure that
established controls are working as indicated.



The final goal of the COBIT audit process is to compute the inherent and future
risk if certain controls are not met, or if certain controls should be recommended
to reduce the future risk score. (Turcato, 2006).

COBIT is in essence the closest to an IT Audit framework on the market today,
and it has developed certain recommended steps of what an audit should include. COBIT
suggests that any internal or external auditor or anyone with information security
responsibilities should do the following to comply with the COBIT framework:


Penetration Testing



Vulnerability Assessment



Physical Access Controls
o Social Engineering



Reporting (Turcato, 2006).

Included are specific guidelines on how to conduct each of these services.
The literature review has identified prominent models and investigated them to
identify their shortcomings as they relate to the requirements for a holistic information
technology audit framework. Based on these shortcomings and regulations, the holistic
IT audit framework can be developed. Chapter 3 will discuss the design science research
methodology utilized for this research.
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CHAPTER 3
Research Methodology
This research is based on Design Science research. The importance of design
science for the information systems design has been well documented in literature
(Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004). Hevner argues that the relevance of information
systems directly relates to the applicability and design. Design science research and
artifacts can be quite complex and need to contribute creative advances to current
theories. As Design Science is increasingly applied to new areas, technical knowledge
within design science is needed, as IT is increasingly applied to new areas. Usually, the
result of the IT artifact relates closely to problem solving and the limitations of people.
Ultimately, theories of the application of the IT artifact will follow the development and
the use of Design Science research in the IT area. They must address the relationship
among business strategy, IT strategy, organizational infrastructure, and IS infrastructure.
This relationship is becoming more crucial as information technologies are seen as
enablers of business strategy and organizational infrastructure (Hevner, March, Park, &
Ram, 2004).
Design science is considered a problem solving process. Hevner et al. (2004)
have developed seven guidelines based on the fact that the researcher must have
knowledge and understanding of the design problem as well as its solution, required to
build and develop an artifact. This research will follow these guidelines as outlined in
Table 2.
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Table 2: Research Methodology
Guidelines

Research Description

Dissertation Requirements

Guideline 1:
Design as an
Artifact

Design-science research must produce a
viable artifact in the form of a construct,
a model, a method, or an instantiation.

 Design a Holistic Information Technology Audit
Framework for Small- and Medium-Sized Financial
Institutions.
 The framework will be based on the Defense-in-Depth
theory.

Guideline 2:
Problem
Relevance

The objective of design-science research
is to develop technology-based solutions
to important and relevant business
problems.

 Regulators require banks and financial institutions to
conduct annual IT Audits to ensure safety of customer
information
 Frameworks today are:
o Not based on Defense-in-Depth
o Large and complex
o Resource intensive
o Not based on regulatory requirements
 Scarce information from regulators:
o FFIEC IT Handbook
o Regulatory Requirements

Guideline 3:
Design
Evaluation

The utility, quality, and efficacy of a
design artifact must be rigorously
demonstrated via well-executed
evaluation methods.

 Artifact Design:
o See the Artifact Design section.
 Artifact Evaluation:
o See the Artifact Evaluation section.

Guideline 4:
Research
Contributions

Effective design-science research must
provide clear and verifiable contributions
in the areas of the design artifact, design
foundations, and/or design
methodologies.

 Propose a new IT Audit Framework based on:
o Defense-in-Depth Theory
o Current Frameworks
o Current Regulatory Requirements

Guideline 5:
Research Rigor

Design-science research relies upon the
application of rigorous methods in both
the construction and evaluation of the
design artifact.

 Based on the Defense-in-Depth Theory
 Results from the evaluation before and after
implementation in two financial institutions using
multiple case study
 Analysis using Cross-Case Synthesis

Guideline 6:
Design as a
Search Process

The search for an effective artifact
requires utilizing available means to
reach desired ends while satisfying laws
in the problem environment.

 Generalizability may not be feasible as the framework is
designed for small- and medium-sized financial
institutions.
 Developed the framework over time
 Feedback from:
o Business implementation
o Research

Guideline 7:
Communication
of Research

Design-science research must be
presented effectively both to technologyoriented as well as management-oriented
audiences.

 Information for both IT practitioners and managers will
be provided through:
o Publications in management
journals/conferences
o Publications in technical
journals/conferences
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Design Validation
Hevner et al. provide five guidelines for design evaluation. The evaluation
process is critical to design science research as it is regarded as an essential component of
the validation of the research. The evaluation of the model is achieved through rigorous
Artifact Design and Artifact Evaluation.
Artifact Design
There are several IT Audit frameworks organizations can use in today’s
information society. However, none of these frameworks is built on what is regarded as
the basis for Information Assurance and Information Security, the Defense-in-Depth
theory. This theory includes three simple, yet critical steps—people, operations, and
technology. The frameworks in this research have proven to fall short of one or more of
the DiD steps, designed to ensure a layered defense architecture. In fact, all of these
frameworks fall short in the people aspect of the DiD theory. People are often considered
the most critical asset and method of protection to any organization, and therefore play a
crucial role in the DiD framework. Most security professionals regard people as the ―first
line of defense‖ in an organization. Furthermore, as discussed in the literature review
section, there is a substantial mismatch in regulatory requirements and the IT audits that
are done with current frameworks. Most of these frameworks are too large for small- and
medium-sized financial institutions that are left to analyze and determine what exactly
pertains to them. Not only are these frameworks large in size, but they also require
special certified consultants at a relatively high cost, therefore difficult for smaller
organizations to justify.
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This research and its IT artifact, a ―Holistic Information Technology Audit
Framework,‖ is based on the Defense-in-Depth theory, as it is regarded the ―best
practice‖ for Information Security. Furthermore, existing frameworks will be used to
develop the details of the new holistic approach. The process of this research is
explained and outlined in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Research Overview
Artifact Evaluation
To validate the field study and answer the three areas outlined above, this research
will be validated through two implementations of the artifact (model) in financial
institutions. Furthermore, evaluation will be conducted through a set of measurable
questions before and after implementation of the model. Four simple questions will be
asked prior to implementation:
1.

What IT audit framework did you previously use to complete your IT audit
requirements?

36

2. What were some of the concerns you had with this framework?
3. Did regulators make any comments about adequacy of this framework?
4. Did regulators indicate that they would like more auditing for:
a. People (social engineering)
b. Process (compliance with regulatory requirements/current framework)
c. Technology (Vulnerability Assessment, Penetration Testing).
Two question sets will be asked after artifact implementation. The first set corresponds
to the pre-implementation questions, comparing these results.
1. How did this framework compare to your previous IT audit?
2. If you had any concerns prior to this audit, did this process take care of these
issues?
3. Did you feel that this IT audit covered all of the following areas:
a. People
b. Operations
c. Technology?
4. Since this IT audit, have you had a regulatory exam?
a. If so, what were the examiner’s comments?
The second question set asked will answer the three research goals, outlined above:
1.

Does this new Holistic IT Audit Framework (artifact) cover and solve issues in
the following areas:
a. Regulatory Mismatch
b. People aspect of auditing
c. More resource effectiveness?
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Validation of this post-assessment will be completed according to the metrics in Table 3.

Table 3: Evaluation Metrics
Resource Effectiveness
Value of Social
Engineering (People
Aspect)

Regulatory Mismatch

Cost
Manpower
Time
Interview
Interview
Interview
Measure Training
Identify Areas of
Training
level
Risk
Suggestions
Test Results
Test Results
Test Results
Framework too
Organization
Not part of
large for
Awareness Lacking
scoping
organization size
Interview/Regulatory Interview/Regulatory
Interview
Reports
Reports

From the Evaluation Metrics this research intends to collect data from three
separate sources to ensure validity. Interviews will be done with a pre- and postassessment questionnaire. The question set is outlined in the Artifact Evaluation section
to evaluate the resource effectiveness of the Holistic IT Audit Framework and potential
regulatory mismatches.
The Value of the Social Engineering Assessment will be evaluated through the
actual IT Audit results. Based on this assessment, the researcher intends to measure the
training level of the institution, such as awareness of internal controls and procedures, as
it relates to Social Engineering. This assessment will also identify any risks the
institution has. For example, awareness is lacking, appropriate recommendations are
made in the IT Audit report.
Finally, regulatory mismatches will be measured through feedback and from the
pre- and post-assessment questionnaire.
This entire process will be done through the utilization of a multiple-case study.
The results will be analyzed using Yin’s recommendations for smaller multiple-case
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studies, Cross-Case Analysis (Yin, 2003). Refer to the Case Study Section for further
details.
Limitations
1.

This research is based on a multiple-case study and has a relatively small
sample. The conclusion of this research will therefore have an inherent
limitation of generalizeability that stems from using a case study approach.

2.

The IT Audit Framework is being developed and tested for small- and
medium-sized financial institutions, but may also be applicable to other
industries. Future research may include possibilities for this framework to be
more general and adaptable to other areas.

This chapter outlined the seven guidelines to design science research and how this
research intends to follow these guidelines. In addition, a multiple-case study was
utilized for validation purposes. Chapter 4 will discuss the development and
requirements of the holistic IT audit model, how it was implemented in the multiple-case
study, and the qualitative analysis on the data to develop conclusions to this research.
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CHAPTER 4
Artifact Design
Existing Models
The literature review section of this research has discussed ISO 27002, COBIT,
and finally, COSO. These three models are generally considered the IT audit models to
follow. When comparing these frameworks with the Defense-in-Depth theory, there are
significant shortcomings, in relationship to the theory itself and to regulatory
requirements set forth by banking regulators. This section will examine these
shortcomings and suggest a new innovative holistic framework to close the gap.
Experts claim that no single enterprise risk management (ERM) framework is
comprehensive enough to cover the entire organization, and that some reinforcements are
needed. In today’s world, organizations are faced with compliance, governance, and risk
management (Briggs, 2007). Combining some of these frameworks may be the best
solution. Briggs (2007) suggests that COBIT plays well with both, COSO and ISO
27002.
One of the biggest advantages of COBIT is that the framework has become so
popular within the industry. Therefore, the COBIT community has developed official
maps to complement other frameworks, such as COSO and ISO 27002. The essential
downfall of COBIT is that it is not an Information Security standard. As described in the
literature review, COBIT has 34 processes, and only one of them relates to information
security. Therefore, it may be a good idea to team COBIT with an Information Security
standard, such as ISO 27002 (Briggs, 2007). Perhaps the biggest strength of the 27002
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standard is that the COBIT framework has been mapped to it, which can help make
external audits more efficient.
If you combine COBIT and ISO 27002, though they complement each other to
create a very complete framework, COBIT by itself with its 34 processes is too complex
for SMEFIs (Small- and Medium- Sized Financial Institutions) (Albayrak, Gadatsch, &
Olufs, 2009), and adding thirteen domains of ISO 27002 will just make the framework
larger. Combining COBIT with COSO will also create a strong framework, with COSO
focusing on the business side, and COBIT focusing on the IT side. However, again, the
framework simply gets too large and complex for a SMEFI to implement.
COSO has also been regarded as one method of implementing internal controls
and complying with SOX section 404. One of the problems with the COSO framework is
that it provides little or no guidance on how to implement the controls. In fact, a study
suggests that only a few percent of the respondents felt that COSO was of value to the
organization (Gupta & Thomson, 2007).
Implementation of these frameworks also brings up another issue—cost. COBIT
and COSO both can be extremely expensive for SMEFIs to implement, and will usually
involve hiring expensive consultants to map the processes to the frameworks.
When examining these frameworks, one can see some definite faults just as
standalone models. When you add requirements, such as the DiD theory, the flaws
become even more significant. ISO strictly covers information security from a
management prospective, meaning policies and procedures. ISO 27002 reflects a more
holistic and managerial approach to IT. By itself, ISO 27002 covers the process section
of the DiD theory. ISO also briefly discusses people, again as it relates to polices, but
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talks little about how to conduct an audit if management conveys these important policies
and procedures to employees of the organization.
Finally, since ISO is not a technical standard, it does not explain or guide
organizations through the implementation process.
COBIT, on the other hand, discusses the process and technology aspect of the
DiD theory. COBIT is strictly technology driven, and provides guidance on how to
implement its controls. Finally, when looking at the people aspect of the DiD theory, as
discussed in the literature review, the audit section does discuss social engineering as a
type of audit.
COSO, on the other hand, covers only one of the three core areas of DiD—
operations. As mentioned, COSO is involving strictly internal controls and affects on the
organization. It is an organizational framework, and provides no specific guidance for
information security or information technology.
None of these frameworks is inherently considered risk-based. Risk-Based
Auditing is simply a method of auditing, and essentially means that the focus of the audit
resources is on critical assets and areas of the organization. This does not mean that you
completely ignore the less important assets, but you focus less on them, or an auditor
would audit fewer controls for these assets. The foundation of any risk-based IT audit is
a solid risk management process. This process will help ensure that a rating is given to
each asset. COBIT, ISO 27002, and COSO all deal with the importance of a risk
management process, but their audits do not build on this process.
Finally, regulatory requirements are another important factor for SMEFI.
Complying with all laws and regulations that regulators set forth is critical to a successful
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IT regulator examination. For decades, SMEFIs have been able to respond to regulations
pertaining only to their state and market. SOX, GLBA, and data and privacy protection
laws have changed that. Today, SMEFIs and most other organizations find themselves
having to answer to regulators, stockholders, and Board of Directors regarding the status
of these requirements pertaining to their industry.
These new regulatory requirements impose new hurdles for organizations as they
relate to compliance. The regulations focus mainly on confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of electronically-held information. Many of these new laws appear to overlap
one another in one way or another. On top of that, very little guidance exists regarding
compliance with these regulations. In fact, in most cases the regulations are technologyneutral and simply describe what needs to get done, but leave out how. Organizations are
therefore left to establish how to meet these requirements (Calder, 2006).
Another issue with these new regulations is that there are no significant case laws
and proven compliance methodologies that the organization can turn to for guidance. No
single technology product can ensure compliance with any of the data security
regulations. Instead, it is composed of technology, procedure, and human behavior, or
DiD (Calder, 2006).
ISO 27002 will, by itself, generally cover most of these regulatory requirements,
and can therefore help organizations with compliance. However, since ISO is geared
towards information security only, it should be combined with another model, such as
COBIT and COSO.
Based on this research, a conclusion can be drawn from the frameworks currently
on the market. A summary of the findings, based on this literature review and the
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requirements of this research can be found in Table 4. If an item is marked with a ―C‖,
it indicates that the model includes that aspect of the research requirements. If an item is
marked‖P‖, it indicates partial fulfillment of the requirement, and finally, if no marks are
outlined, it indicates that there is no fulfillment of the requirements based on the research
questions and requirements.
Table 4: Current Frameworks and Shortcomings
Requirements
Defense-in-Depth
People
Operations
Technology
Risk-Based Auditing
Information Security

ISO
27002
P
C
C
C

Designed for Smalland Medium-Sized
Financial Institutions

COBIT
P
C
C
P
P

COSO
ERM
P
C
Legends:
C

C = Compliant
P = Partially
Compliant

Holistic IT Audit Framework for Small- and Medium-Sized Financial Institutions
Based on earlier discussions in this research, it can be determined that current IT
audit frameworks have significant shortcomings in relationship to SMEFIs. First of all,
when comparing each model to the DiD theory, the research showed that all of them have
a lot to be desired when it comes to the people aspect of this theory. The frameworks
does have some discussions about people—ISO 27002 has a personnel security section of
its framework—but the IT Audit section does not discuss the importance of conducting
annual assessments that test the effectiveness of controls. COSO strictly focuses on the
internal processes of an organization and will therefore inherently focus on people in the
organization. However, COSO is not IT or Information Security based, and therefore
leaves out assessments relating to that.
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Furthermore, none of these frameworks is particularly designed for SMEFIs,
though, as discussed, they do comply with regulatory requirements. Additionally, these
frameworks can be very costly to implement, as they will require specialized consultants.
Since these frameworks are comprehensive in their own way, ISO for Information
Security, COBIT for IT governance, and COSO for its internal controls, ultimately, they
are simply too large for most SMIFEs.
Finally, none of these current frameworks is considered risk-based. The FFIEC
requires all financial institutions to conduct a risk-based IT audits on an annual basis.
These frameworks can all be made risk-based, but the process will be lengthy.
Based on this research, the researcher is suggesting the following framework as
outlined in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Holistic IT Audit Framework for SMEFIs
IT Risk Assessment
A thorough IT risk assessment is the initial step to a sound Information Security
Program, and a risk-based IT audit program (Accounting Web, 2008). The risk
assessment is an ongoing process of evaluating threats and vulnerabilities and applying
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mitigation strategies to each asset (FDIC, 1999). There are several ways of conducting a
risk assessment, and several methodologies have been developed. Among them are
OCTAVE, CORAS, ISO, NIST, and COBIT, and the institution may implement any of
these methodologies. It is up to the auditor to determine whether the risk assessment
process is adequate. This step of the risk-based audit will ensure that focus is given to
critical assets rather than simply focusing on every single control for each asset. Are
your printers equally critical to a core banking system? Obviously, the answer is ―no.‖
Ensuring a sound risk assessment will ensure that assets are rated appropriately, and that
focus during the IT audit process is given to critical assets.

Regulatory Compliance
The main focus of regulatory compliance in this context is a verification of what the
organization has in place, and how well it is in place. The auditor can use ISO 27002,
combined with COBIT, to get a general understanding of the organization’s information
technology and security controls. Usually, a questionnaire can be utilized to gain the
basic understanding of this. As an auditor is generally not too familiar with all regulatory
requirements, it may be useful to utilize ISO and COBIT, as they will cover all of the
regulatory requirements.
Social Engineering
Security is a difficult culture, and is mainly based on trust in protection and
authenticity. As discussed earlier, people are generally considered the weakest link in
any security chain. The willingness of humans to accept someone’s word leaves so many
organizations open to attacks from potential social engineers. It really does not matter
how many articles are published about network vulnerabilities, patches, and firewalls—
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the threat can only be partially reduced. Then it is up to the employees of the organization
to keep the corporate network secure (Granger, 2001). Exploiting this weak link to
acquire unauthorized information is referred to as Social Engineering. It is the art of
deceiving people into acting in a manner that may result in unauthorized disclosure of
information or unauthorized access to systems. Social Engineering preys on qualities of
human nature, such as the desire to be helpful, the tendency to trust people, and the fear
of getting into trouble. The purpose of the Social Engineering Assessment is to protect
the institution’s information by identifying weaknesses through the testing of employees
and business processes against common social engineering attacks.
COBIT suggests that Social Engineering Assessments should be a part of the IT
Audit process. This process will test the controls, such as policies and procedures, as
well as training to ensure that employees are aware of and able to identify attempts of
social engineering. COBIT suggests the following assessments:


Telephone Access: The more the intruder knows about the organization, the easier
it will be to get access to critical information.



Dumpster Diving: Going through the dumpster verifies that confidential data is
shredded appropriately.



Desktop Review: This ensures that computers are locked and screen savers are
turned on, and that no critical information is on the desk (COBIT, 2004).

Other critical tests may include:


Physical Impersonation: Impersonating one of the organization’s service
providers to attempt to gain access to critical areas of the bank.
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Phishing Scam: Deploying an email phishing scam to ensure that employees are
not providing sensitive information.



Physical Security Assessment: checking the institution’s physical areas, such as
cameras, monitor viewing angles, and general physical security issues.
From my experience with social engineering assessments, institutions have a hard

time passing these tests, although with training, awareness, and with management support
in the enforcement of policies, it becomes increasingly difficult to get critical
information. However, this shows the importance of conducting annual Social
Engineering assessments.
Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing
The FDIC suggests that a Vulnerability Assessment (VA) and a Penetration Test
(PT) can be an integral part of an institution’s Information Security Program (ISP). All
financial institutions are required to implement an ISP. This program is designed to
make the Board of Directors as well as senior management aware of information security
issues in the development of this critical ISP. This program should outline a proactive
and ongoing concept that incorporates the following three components:


Prevention includes security policies, well-designed system architecture, properly
configured firewalls, and strong authentication programs.



Detection is the method of reviewing and analyzing information that helps
determine if data has been compromised, misused, or accessed by unauthorized
individuals. An Intrusion Detection System (IDSs) device can help an institution
monitor exactly that. It acts as a burglar alarm, alerting the institution to potential
external break-ins or internal misuse of systems being monitored. A VA and PT
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are, according to the FDIC, excellent detection methods that an institution should
utilize.


Response is another key area of the ISP. It involves the preparation of a response
program that assists the institution with handling intrusion incidents once they are
detected. All financial institutions should have a comprehensive Emergency
Preparedness Plan in place. Such a plan should include Business Continuity,
Disaster Recovery, and an Incident Response Plan. These plans should document
and discuss responses to incidents as well as establish reporting requirements.
(FDIC, 1999)

Vulnerability Assessment
A Vulnerability Assessment tool, also called security scanning tool, is used for an
assessment of a particular network or a host system. It scans everything on a network,
such as servers, firewalls, routers, and applications for vulnerabilities, and detects known
flaws and bugs in software and hardware. A database within the tool maintains a list of
these known issues. On a regular basis, these are updated to add new vulnerabilities. VA
scans can also determine if settings on the network, such as passwords, are set according
to security policies the bank has documented.
When utilizing any of these VA tools, it is critical to consider how often they are
updated to include new vulnerabilities. A VA is not generally done on a real-time basis,
but rather conducted periodically, and SMEFIs are generally expected to conduct an
assessment at least annually or when the network changes significantly.
No matter the tool or provider that the organization selects, VA tools can generate
both, technical and management reports, including text, charts, and graphs. The report
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will lay out the vulnerabilities and weaknesses that exist on the network and explain how
to fix these issues (FDIC, 1999).

Penetration Testing
Penetration Testing (PT) is another important aspect of a comprehensive IT Audit.
It is an analysis of a bank’s external network connections (Internet, FedLine, Internet
Banking, etc.), usually conducted by experts and designed to measure if connections and
ports are vulnerable to a series of attacks. Similar to the VA, it is designed to identify the
weaknesses and propose corrective actions.

A PT is critical to an organization, but, as mentioned earlier, becomes even more
critical if the institution has any external access points. According to the FDIC, the PT
should be done by an independent, usually external, organization. For SMEFIs in
particular, this should be conducted on an annual basis, or when significant network
changes occurs.
After the initial risk assessment is completed, management may determine if a
penetration analysis (test) should be conducted. For the purpose of this paper,
"penetration analysis" is broadly defined. Bank management should determine the scope
and objectives of the analysis. The scope can range from a specific test of a particular
information system's security or a review of multiple information security processes in an
institution.
Though a PT is extremely critical, it does not provide a guarantee that the systems
being tested are secure, because they are snapshots of the institution’s security measures
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at a certain point in time. That is why conducting a PT on a regular basis is important as
new vulnerabilities become known.
The PT itself can sometimes impose new risks to an institution. Therefore it is
important to consider some of the following items before conducting a test:


The reputation of the external entity hired to conduct the evaluation should be
checked. The same type of precautions for hiring a new employee should be
considered (background checks, etc.). This is important, because the consultant
or organization will have access to confidential data when conducting these tests.
This is critical, because the entity may exploit the vulnerabilities.



Some managers want to keep a PT secret to the Information Security Officer
(ISO) and other IT personnel. This is not always a good thing, and it is important
to keep in mind the consequences of this, such as unwanted results, including law
enforcement notifications. To prevent this, it may be good practice to at least
inform certain people, such as the ISO, of a PT being conducted to ensure
appropriate responses.



The final aspect to be considered is the importance of the systems being tested.
The bank may have determined from its Risk Management results that certain
systems are simply too critical to be exposed to some of the methods utilized by a
PT (FDIC, 1999).

COBIT also notes the importance of integrating PT and VA into the IT Audit
(COBIT, 2004).
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Research Findings
Figure 9 outlines and compares the Holistic IT Audit Framework to the DiD
theory, and maps each area of the framework with the theory.

People

• Social Engineering
Assessment

Technology

• Vulnerability Assessment
• Penetration Testing

Operations

• Regulatory Requirenments
• Risk-Based IT Audit
Figure 9: Framework vs. Theory

According to the DiD theory, People include policies and procedures, physical
security, training and awareness, and personnel security. Conducting a Social
Engineering Assessment will ensure that policies and procedures are communicated to
the organization’s employees. Furthermore, based on the assessment results, the auditor
is able to recommend training improvements after reviewing the institution’s current
program. Conducting a Physical Security Assessment will ensure that the organization
has taken appropriate measures to protect sensitive information. Items to look for in a
physical security assessment are alarms, fire extinguishers, privacy screens for monitors,
and locked doors.
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The technology aspect of the DiD theory is covered mainly by conducting a VA
and a PT. However, ensuring that appropriate controls are in place, based on the
institution’s size and complexity, is also measured through the IT risk assessment.
Since ISO 27002 and COBIT include many of the processes that are critical to IT
and Information Security, utilizing these frameworks is critical in the audit process and
ensures regulatory compliance. Both frameworks are updated regularly to include new
requirements.
Finally, the cost of implementing this holistic IT Audit Framework is
considerably less. With this framework, the organization is able to determine what
should be included in an annual IT Audit to meet regulatory requirements. The model is
comprehensive, thus covers a variety of areas, and will ultimately provide the institution
with assurance that the framework is successful. Implementing this framework will also
ensure that the institution stays ahead of regulatory requirements because of the industry
standard that both COBIT and ISO provide.

Case Study
Feagin et. al. (1991) have stated a case study methodology can be ideal when the
researcher is investigating a holistic artifact. Case studies in the past have been widely
used in sociological studies and increasingly in instruction (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg,
1991). Yin (2003) as well as others have developed sound procedures on how to conduct
case studies. When following these procedures, the researcher is able to utilize well
tested and documented procedures. Case study analysis and data collection are designed
to investigate the viewpoint of the actual participants by utilizing multiple sources of data
(Yin, 2003).
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Yin (2003) outlines five components for case study research:
1. Outlining the study’s questions, forming the question in terms of ―what‖, ―who‖,
―where‖, ―how‖, and finally ―why‖. Yin suggests that ―how‖ and ―why‖
questions will lean towards a case study. This research is intended to answer the
following questions:
a. How does the Holistic IT Audit Framework impact the overall quality of
an IT audit for small- and medium- sized financial institutions?
b. How does the People aspect impact the comprehensiveness of the IT audit
process?
c. How does implementing the Holistic IT Audit framework impact
resources needed to complete the audit compared to other frameworks?
These questions were developed to further validate the IT Audit model in addition
to the design science methodology. Beyond the literature review and the
development of the artifact, these case study questions will be used to determine
the success of this case study. When investigating the literature review, it
becomes evident that a clear validation is not present, which is why a case study is
essential (Yin, 2003).
2. Studying Propositions. This research does not have any specific propositions
because it is based on a survey of two institutions. However, there is still a
significant purpose to the study. It is based on the three research questions
identified and is meant to measure:
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a. If the successful implementation of the Holistic IT Audit Framework
increases the quality of the IT audit, not only as it relates to current
models, but in general to what the institution is currently doing.
b. Secondly, this case study and its questions are designed to determine if the
people aspect of IT auditing has any impact of the comprehensiveness of
the IT audit.
c. Finally, this case study intends to determine if implementing the holistic
IT audit framework will decrease resources needed from the financial
institution, both in terms of cost, as well as the institution’s own resources.
The collection of the data used for this analysis will be done through the
following methods:


Interviews, a pre- and post-assessment will be conducted with the
Information Security Officer (ISO). The Methodology section lists the
questions asked prior to any IT audit work, as well as upon completion of
the IT audit.



IT audit reports, evidence, and recommendations will be collected through
work papers during the IT audit, the actual audit reports, and notes.



Finally, any regulatory reports will be utilized. The researcher has access
to these reports onsite. However, no examiner reports were taken off site
and kept as part of this research. Furthermore, any specific comments and
behavior of the examiners were reported to the researcher by the ISO.

3. The Unit of analysis for this case study is based on the two financial institutions
where the Holistic IT Audit Framework was implemented. Specifically, the
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―cases‖ for the study or the subject will be the Information Security Officers at the
institutions. Furthermore, results from regulatory exams will be utilized to further
validate the results. It is critical to note that this framework will only be tested and
implemented for financial institutions.
4. The logical proposition of this research is the investigation of the research
questions outlined in step 1 through implementation in two cases. The linking of
propositions or the coding and analysis of the data will be collected from pre- and
post-assessment interviews with the ISO, IT audit reports, and, finally, regulatory
exams and comments.
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings. After collecting all the data, qualitative
analysis will be performed. The analysis of the data collected will be coded based
on nine separate areas, outlined in the methodology section above. The coding
and category system involves stringent review of the data collected, line by line.
The researcher will analyze the data and extract information from the sources
outlined and put them into their respective category to further examine the results.
Since this is a multiple-case study, further validation will be performed using
Cross-Case Synthesis analysis, a comparison of the results in both institutions.
Based on this, results can be extracted and conclusions to the research questions
developed. Because only two case studies were conducted, no statistical
calculations are possible, but Yin (2003) states that as long as two rival
propositions are studied, and conclusions can be drawn, it satisfies this criteria.
Yin (2003) further outlines that validity plays an important role in any case study
research. Four tests have been commonly used to establish quality in empirical social
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research. Yin suggests that these four tests are also relevant to case studies. The four
validity tests are: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability.
This research will comply with these guidelines as described in Table 5.
Table 5: Case Study Validity Tests
Tests
Construct
Validity

Case Study Tactic
1. Use multiple sources
of evidence
2. Establish Chain of
Evidence
3. Informants review

Internal
Validity

1. Address rival
explanations

External
Validity

1. Replication Logic

Reliability

1. Use case study
protocol

Compliance
1. DiD Theory, regulatory
requirements, ISO
assessments
2. Evidence of the case study
will be collected in form of
interviews, examiners reports.
3. Informants will review their
responses.
1. Thorough literature review
that will investigate current
models
2. Based on current models and
examining the cases and
effects of these models
1. The model will be tested in
two institutions to determine
if the results are the same
1. Ensuring a repeatable process
through documentation of
research

Phase of Research
1. Data collection
2. Data collection
3. Composition

Data collection

Research design

Data collection

A SMEFI is considered small to medium when its assets are below 500 million
dollars. Through this study, the researcher has designed and implemented the Holistic IT
Audit Framework in two financial institutions. One has assets of 250 million dollars with
six locations throughout Nebraska and Kansas, the second institution with two branches
in South Dakota is a 50-million-dollar bank.
The process that was followed consisted of the following:
1. Pre-Assessment Questionnaire (Refer to the Methodology section.)
2. Audit Model Implementation (conducting the VA, PT, Social Engineering, Risk
Assessment, and Compliance)
3. Deliver Reports
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4. Post-Assessment Questionnaire (Refer to the Methodology section.)
5. Examination Results
6. Regulatory Feedback (if any)
The initial step in both institutions was to develop an adequate risk assessment
methodology. For the purpose of this research, Figure 10 outlines the method utilized.

Figure 10: IT Risk Assessment Process
Previous research has suggested that a new innovative Risk Management Program
can help with risk management for small- and medium-sized financial institutions
(SMERAM) (Podhradsky, Streff, Engebretson, & Lovaas, 2009). SMERAM helps
determine if institutions are compliant with regulatory requirements and if each asset falls
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within the acceptable risk level that is dependent on the size and complexity of the
financial institution. ―Each institution has its own acceptable risk level, which is derived
from its legal and regulatory compliance responsibilities, its threat profile, and its
business drivers and impacts‖ (Harris, 2006). For more details on the Risk Assessment
Process and for a detailed example on how this method was audited risk-based, refer to
Appendix A.
The second aspect of the Holistic IT Audit Framework is regulatory compliance.
The researcher developed a questionnaire that will make the auditor more familiar with
the organization as it relates to regulatory compliance. The questions are based on ISO,
COBIT, and other regulations that financial institutions must comply with. The entire
questionnaire can be found in Appendix C. It is the basis for adequacy and compliance
recommendations upon completion of the IT audit. The auditors asked the ISO of the
institution all of the questions and, based on the answers, were able to create a work plan.
These questions ask for yes and no answers. Further documentation will need to be
investigated onsite. The process utilized for the compliance section is outlined in Figure
11.
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Figure 11: IT Audit Compliance Process
Two methods of social engineering were performed at both locations and at all of
their branches. The institutions were able to pick between the following methods:


Dumpster Diving



Physical Security Assessment



Phishing Scam



Phone

Both institutions chose physical security assessment. For work papers, please refer to
Appendix D. Figure 12 outlines the Social Engineering Assessment process utilized for
this study.
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Figure 12: Social Engineering Assessment Process
Finally, the Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Tests were performed at
both institutions utilizing Nessus software. The Vulnerability Assessment was based on
the IP address range that was given to the auditor at the time of the audit. The assessment
took place onsite. Figure 13 outlines the VA process utilized. The Penetration Test
conducted was completed offsite, and again was based on the scoping the institutions had
already done.

Figure 14 outlines the process utilized.

Figure 13: Vulnerability Assessment Process
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Figure 14: Penetration Testing Process
The VA and PT conclude the Holistic IT Audit framework.
Pre-Assessment Questionnaire Results
When this research was conducted, the researcher was employed as a consultant
by an information security consulting organization specializing in bank and financial
security. This organization had created an IT audit contract with two financial
institutions, one with an asset size of 250 million, hereafter named Bank X, and an
institution with an asset size of 50 million, hereafter named Bank Y. Both institutions
were asked by the researcher to take part in the development of the holistic IT Audit
framework specially designed for small- and medium-sized financial institutions. Both
agreed to go through pre- and post-assessment questionnaire to determine if the research
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questions for this research had been satisfied. Prior to agreeing to take part, the process
of the IT audit framework was explained in detail to the institutions, and any questions
were answered. Because the consulting company is known for its security expertise, no
additional liabilities were required from the institutions. Furthermore, since the
framework is built on proven theory, current frameworks, and regulatory requirements,
the process was very smooth. Following the consent of each institution, prior to the IT
Audit work, the pre-assessment questionnaire had to be filled out, in this case by the
institution’s Information Security Officer (ISO).
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Table 6: Pre-Assessment Questions
Pre-Assessment Questions

Bank X

Bank Y

1. What IT Audit Framework
did you previously use to
complete your IT Audit
requirements?

The bank previously only completed
some internal auditing. No
framework was utilized.

Did not have a framework in
place. Did some policy
compliance audits, but it did
not satisfy regulators.

2. What were some of the
concerns you had with this
framework?

Examiners wanted more details,
covering additional areas.

Not covering IT, system
controls, and not based on a
framework for SMEFIs.

3. Did regulators make any
comments about adequacy
of this framework?

The OCC specifically asked the bank
to conduct annual penetration tests,
vulnerability assessments, and
external IT auditing. The OCC also
required the IT audit to be riskbased.

Prior to this IT Audit,
regulators required the
institution to expand its IT
audit program to cover IT
assets, policy, VA, PT, SE,
regulatory compliance. The
audit should also be done by
an external entity and be riskbased.

Examiners have not specifically
asked for a social engineering
assessment.

Examiners suggested the
institution complete a social
engineering assessment.

b. Process
(compliance with
regulatory
requirements/
current framework)

Examiners wanted the institution to
improve its overall information
security posture, including risk
management.

Regulators suggested the
institution expand its
compliance efforts with its
own policy to include more
regulatory requirements, as
well as be based on the
institution’s risk assessment.

c.

Examiners suggested that in addition
to the IT audit the institution conduct
annual vulnerability assessments and
Penetration Testing on its IT system.

Last exam suggested that the
institution complete annual
Penetration Testing and
Vulnerability Assessments on
its IT systems.

4. Did regulators indicate that
they would like more
auditing for:
a.

People (social
engineering)

Technology
(Vulnerability
Assessment,
Penetration
Testing)?
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Upon completion of the pre-assessment, a compliance questionnaire was
distributed to the ISO. The ISO and the organization had five business days to respond to
the questions. The questions were based on federal regulation, and in particular the
FFIEC IT Handbook (FFIEC, n.d), the Information Technology Examination Officer’s
Questionnaire (FDIC, 2005), as well as ISO 27002, COBIT, and other good security
practices that institutions have in place and should implement. (For a specific list of
questions, please refer to Appendix C.) At the same time, the researcher asked for
evaluation of the most current IT risk assessment. He evaluated the risk assessment
methods utilized. Based on the results, he utilized the risk assessment methodology
mentioned above to develop his own methodology and threats and controls. For an
example of controls for one asset/threat combination, refer to Appendix A.
Once the risk assessment and IT audit questionnaire was completed, the auditor
(researcher in this case) spent time on getting the work papers documented. The initial
step in this risk-based IT audit framework is to determine what controls from the risk
assessment process should be audited. This process is usually completed with the
institution to ensure that ratings are correctly assigned. The rating for each asset is
determined on the basis of what is most critical to the institution. Based on this, each
asset will get a high, medium, or low rating. The inherent risk rating is based on how the
organization and auditor rate the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of each asset.
An example of what the inherent risk table could look like can be found in Table 7.
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Table 7: Risk Assessment Table
Asset

Confidentiality

Integrity

Availability

Inherent Risk

H

H

H

H

M

H

L

M

H
H
H
H
M
M
H
L
H
M
L

H
H
M
M
M
M
H
M
H
H
L

M
H
L
L
H
M
H
L
H
L
M

H
H
M
M
M
M
H
L
H
M
L

Core Banking
System
Check Imaging
Server
Terminal Server
Web Server
Lending
Deposit
Firewall
ATM
Thin Clients
Laptops
Backup Tapes
Phone Banking
Printers

To make the risk assessment process risk-based, the researcher suggests the
following as outlined in Table 8:
Table 8: Risk-Based Risk Assessment IT Audit
Asset Rating
High

Required Controls (Adequacy and
Compliance)
 All controls must be audited for
both compliance and adequacy.

Medium – High



All high and medium rated
controls must be audited for
compliance and adequacy.

Medium



75 percent of the high rated
controls,
25 percent of medium rated
controls,
and 25 percent of low rated
controls
50 percent of high rated controls,
and no more than 25 percent of
medium rated controls
10 percent of the low rated
controls
25 percent of high rated controls
10 percent of medium rated
controls



Low – Medium





Low




Optional Controls (Adequacy and
Compliance)
NA


A collection of low rated
controls should also be
audited for compliance and
adequacy.



The auditor may decide
that for certain assets, more
controls must be audited.



The auditor may decide
that for certain assets, more
controls must be audited.
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Following this process ensures that the process is risk-based, and that audit
resources are focused on the institution’s critical assets.
The second step, prior to the onsite visit, is the IT Audit questionnaire. The
auditor went through this questionnaire, not only to determine what to look for, but also
to learn all about the institution, to develop an understanding of what is being done, and
to determine if there are areas the institutions needs to improve. The analysis of the
questionnaire is fairly straightforward. The auditor will go through the answers, one by
one, and, based on the institutions’ responses, will determine how to further investigate a
specific topic or control. Usually, there are three ways to determine this—by interview,
further documentation, or physical checks. With experience and knowledge, this process
can be completed fairly quickly. If the auditor wishes to make this process risk-based as
well, he/she can rate the various areas, and even drill down to each question to determine
its criticality. These ratings may change, based on the size and complexity of the
institution.
Once these two tasks are done and the work papers for the risk assessment,
compliance, and physical checks have been completed, the auditor will schedule the
onsite visit. (For an example work paper, see Appendices B and C.) The onsite portion
of the IT Audit may be quite time consuming, again depending on the size and
complexity of the institution.
During the onsite visit, the Vulnerability Assessment utilizing Nessus must also
be completed. This process scans all the devices on the bank’s network for
vulnerabilities. The Penetration Test may also be done at the same time, but it is not
necessary to conduct this assessment onsite.
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Based on the results of the onsite visit, the auditor will document
recommendations in two ways, adequacy and compliance. The adequacy piece will allow
the auditor to investigate the controls that the institution has documented, and how the
bank meets these requirements. If a control is not satisfactory, the auditor will make an
adequacy recommendation. If certain controls are not in place, but the auditor determines
that they should be, a compliance recommendation is prepared.
Once the findings are documented in an IT Audit report, delivered, and explained
to the Board of Directors and to the ISO, the IT Audit is considered to be completed.
Post-Assessment Questionnaire Results
After the report was delivered to the institution, the researcher asked the
following questions (See Table 9) to verify that the Holistic IT Audit Framework fulfilled
the requirements of this research. The subjects for this post assessment included the ISO.
The Board of Directors was present in the event that they should have any comments
about the process.
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Table 9: Post-Assessment Questions
Post-Assessment Questions
1. How did this
framework compare to
your previous IT
Audit?
2.

If you had any
concerns prior to this
audit, did this process
take care of these
issues?

3.

Did you feel that this
IT Audit covered all of
the following areas?
a. People

4.

Bank X
The bank previously conducted a policy
audit, not risk-based. This is the bank’s
second IT audit and covers additional areas,
including policy and regulatory compliance.
Most importantly, it was risk-based.
The main concern before conducting external
audit was staff knowledge, and as time went
on, IT audits and examiners’ requirements
simply got too complicated.

Bank Y
The bank felt comfortable that a
framework was in place that
covered regulatory
requirements.

Because of the physical review/social
engineering assessment, this framework
covered the people aspect of DiD.

The social engineering
assessment was an eye opener to
the entire organization, a great
addition to the bank’s IT audit
requirements and a great lesion
to all of the employees.
Processes were covered through
policy compliance as well as
recommendations for other
issues the bank should consider
implementing to improve its
Information Security Posture.
The VA and PT covered the
technology aspects of the IT
Audit framework nicely. All
machines and external access
points were scanned.
Yes, in December 2009
(Federal).

b.

Process

Policies and overall information security
posture were checked and improvements
were suggested.

c.

Technology

The vulnerability assessment and penetration
test satisfied regulatory requirements, as well
as the technology aspect of the DiD.

Since this IT Audit,
have you had a
regulatory exam?
a. If so, what
were the
examiners’
comments?

Yes, October 2009 (State)

Examiners did not particularly talk about the
audit process, and had no suggestions of
improvements.

The previous audit was not
based on theory, and it was not
risk-based according to
regulators. This framework was
risk-based and covered a broad
range of issues and was based
on DiD.

Head examiner made specific
comments on the IT audit
framework and its holistic
approach, being risk-based,
covering regulatory
requirements, appropriate for the
institution’s size and
complexity.
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Table 10: Post-Exam Questions
Post-Regulatory Exam Questions
1. Does this new Holistic IT Audit
Framework (artifact) cover and
solve issues in the following areas:
a. Regulatory Mismatch

Bank X

Regulators utilized the IT
audit report to make
recommendations and areas
of improvements.

b.

People aspect of auditing

Social Engineering was not
specifically recommended,
but the bank wants to
conduct annual assessments.

c.

More resource effective?

The bank freed up internal
resources, and feels
confident in the process.
Great learning experience
that will make the bank look
at improvements and move
forward as it relates to
information security.

Bank Y

No recommendation from
the lead examiner was made
in regards to the IT Audit
framework. Regulators
were excited about the IT
audit efforts being done at
the bank.
The institution will keep
doing social engineering
assessments on an annual
basis as part of their IT
Audit.
NA. The bank did not
previously conduct external
audits.

Data Analysis, Pre- and Post-Assessment Results
Coding and Developing Categories
The case study results from interviews, examiners comments and reports, and IT
audit reports gave significant results to be examined. The researcher developed nine
categories based on the research metrics outlined in the Research Methodology. All the
data collected was examined and put into these categories to determine if significant
results could be developed. The coding and categories will be used to examine the case
study purpose and questions.
Appendix E outlines the results of the qualitative data analysis. Tables 11, 12 and
13 outline a summary of the results based on each research question and its categories.
The initial case study research question was set to answer the following question:
How does the Holistic IT Audit Framework impact the overall quality of an IT audit for
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small- and medium- sized financial institutions? The categories to measure this question
are outlined in Table 11.
Table 11: Case Study Question 1 Result Summary
Category
Effectiveness

Identify Areas of Risk

Organization
Awareness Lacking

Framework too large
for size of
organization

Summary

ISO states that external auditing with such broad topics creates a
complete and effective IT audit.
Another consideration when discussing effectiveness is that these
institutions would not have to have any awareness of the technology,
theory, and methods of the IT audit framework. That means that
staffing is less of an issue. Furthermore, instead of addressing IT
audit recommendations from the past and conducting IT audits,
critical personnel can be used to address issues and focus on one area.
Several areas of risk were discovered throughout the IT Audit
process. When examining the IT Audit reports for both institutions,
an average of 30 recommendations per institution was identified.
Through the IT audit process it was discovered that both institutions
were lacking awareness of both internal processes of the institutions
as well as regulatory requirements. As mentioned earlier, on an
average 30 recommendations were made per institution. The IT
Audit Questionnaire developed in Appendix D has 124 questions and
is based on regulatory requirements. That in essence indicates that
each institution is 24% incompliant with regulations.
Because neither institution utilized any framework previously, it is
difficult to determine from the interviews and observations if the
framework fits SMEFIs. However, through the literature review,
conclusions can be drawn that existing frameworks are simply too
large and bulky for these types of organizations. Additionally, the
expense for hiring such consultants is significant and difficult for
these institutions to justify. Finally, implementing any of these
frameworks will require specialized consultants for extended periods
of time.

The second case study research question to be investigated was: How does the
People aspect impact the comprehensiveness of the IT audit process? Table 12 outlines
the categories used to measure this question.
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Table 12: Case Study Question 2 Result Summary
Category

Summary

Based on the IT Audit reports for both institutions, it can clearly be
identified that several recommendations were made relating to
training. The physical assessment developed for the process
measured the level of training for each institution. Not only was
physical security measured, but social engineering schemes such as
shoulder surfing were investigated as well.
Measure Training
Level

Training Suggestions

Furthermore, through interviews it was determined that the physical
assessment results were extremely important recommendations to the
Banks. For example, Bank Y has several branches and is often not
able to check the different sites for physical security. This type of
assessment creates overall value to the audit, as more traditional
audits simply focus on the main branch location where most of the IT
assets are located.
During the IT audit it was recommended that both institutions
implement better security awareness programs. Little or no training
existed. Furthermore, it was discovered that Bank Y did not have a
security awareness program at all. Regulators require institutions to
develop a training program. Social engineering is a great source for
discovering areas where the institution could use more training and
awareness. Furthermore, both institutions felt that this was a great
assessment and discovered several vulnerabilities in their
organization.

Table 13 outlines the answers to the third and final case study research question:
How does implementing the Holistic IT Audit framework impact resources needed to
complete the audit compared to other frameworks?
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Table 13: Case Study Question 3 Result Summary
Summary
Category
As neither institution conducted any IT auditing functions prior to
implementing the Holistic IT Audit framework, the cost perspective
is difficult to determine. However, from comments made, both
institutions felt the value of conducting external IT auditing, not
necessarily because of cost savings, but for the safety of having one
Cost
done. Furthermore, as other research and experts have stated,
security cannot be measured in dollars and cents because it is
extremely difficult to put a value on customer information (Davidson,
2009).
Manpower needed to complete the IT Audit is considered to be more
than what the institutions used previously. The main reason for this is
that neither institution really completed any form of auditing.
In addition, from the data collected, it can also be determined that the
institutions simply did not have enough time, manpower, and
knowledge to conduct IT Audits that covered all of the regulatory
Manpower
requirements and recommendations from previous exams.
The main reason both institutions contracted to conduct external IT
auditing was on the requests of regulators. The internal auditing
completed previously was simply not sufficient according to
regulators.
The ISO stated that the external IT audit did not take as long as that
of the internal auditor. Specialized auditors know what they are
looking for and therefore, time spent onsite is considerably less.

Time

Not part of scoping

The second time factor that should be taken into consideration is the
fact that for these institutions to conduct their own IT Audits, it would
most likely require several training seminars that can be very
expensive. In addition, when considering the software utilized for the
Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Tests, conducting a
Holistic IT Audit can become extremely costly for these relatively
small organizations.
Because neither institution had previously conducted IT Audits, any
results drawn from the data analysis is deemed inconclusive.
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Another important aspect of case study research is the data analysis. However,
according to Yin, it is one of the least developed aspects of completing a case study (Yin,
2003). Yin outlines three general strategies, and in particular ―relying on theoretical
propositions‖, which is considered the most preferred strategy. Because this study
considered a multiple-case study, Yin suggests utilizing the Cross-Case Synthesis as a
specific analytical tool for multiple case studies such as this. A Cross-Case Synthesis
treats each of the cases as an individual study, utilizing the results from each individual
case and incorporating them into a multiple case study. Yin also suggests that if there are
large numbers of cases, quantitative analysis can be performed. Because of the small
number of cases in this research, Yin suggests using word tables to display the individual
cases in a uniform framework (Yin, 2003). One important aspect to remember when
using this type of analysis is that it relies strictly on argumentative interpretation, and not
quantitative methods (Yin, 2003).
Based on Yin’s recommendations, and Table 3, the evaluation framework will be
split into three categories: Resource Effectiveness, Value of Social Engineering, and less
Regulatory Mismatch. The results of the Cross-Synthesis Analysis can be found in
Appendix F. From this analysis it can be concluded that both institutions were located in
rural areas and independently owned and operated. Furthermore, based on the categories,
both institutions have similar results, such as not previously having conducted any form
of external IT audit. Both institutions also reported positively on regulatory feedback on
the Holistic IT Audit Model. Both institutions also found great value of implementing
the model, because of its holistic approach and coverage of all critical areas. The people
aspect of auditing became crucial to both institutions, and recommendations were made
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based on these results that gave the institutions both training suggestions and general
awareness. Finally, neither of the institutions received any IT audit recommendations
from regulators. In fact, in both cases examiners utilized the reports to conduct their own
IT exams.
Case Study Result Summary
The experience of this research was extremely positive. Feedback from both
regulators as well as the institutions indicates that the framework for this research meets
requirements set forth. One of the issues with this research is that very little knowledge
of security and IT existed in the banks. Neither of the institution really conducted any
formal IT auditing previously, making it difficult to compare previous frameworks with
the new Holistic IT Audit approach. The case study had three critical questions to
answer. These answers and this conclusion are drawn from the implementation in the
two institutions. Furthermore, the results were qualitatively analyzed by developing
categories and labels from the pre-assessment, post-assessment, regulatory feedback,
interviews, and literature review. A summary of the category results, based on the nine
labels taken from the Evaluation Metrics outlined in Chapter 2 can be found in Table 11
to Table 13. Because this case study was based on two individual cases, a CrossSynthesis analysis was performed to compare the results from the two institutions. The
Cross-Synthesis analysis results can be found in Appendix F. For a complete list of the
data analysis and results, refer to Appendix E.
This case study intended to have the following three questions answered:
a. How does the Holistic IT Audit Framework impact the overall quality of
an IT audit for small- and medium-sized financial institutions?
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When discussing and determining the overall impact on quality of the Holistic IT
Audit framework, it is safe to conclude that the quality of the audit was high. First of all,
neither institution conducted IT audits previously. Secondly, regulators actually utilized
the results of these audits to determine what they were examining and recommending.
Additionally, when looking at the literature review, having a framework specifically
designed for SMEFIs will also improve the overall quality of the IT audit.
In addition, examiners had previously recommended the institutions conduct
external IT auditing and further explained that this process should be risk-based and
include Penetration Testing, Vulnerability Assessments, Compliance with regulatory
requirements. These requirements were the very criteria that this research is based on.
b. How does the People aspect impact the comprehensiveness of the IT audit
process?
From the evidence provided in the data analysis, the impact of the
comprehensiveness of the IT audit is also significant. Through the onsite visitation,
several areas were identified as potential training and awareness issues with each
institution. From the very basics of creating a security awareness program to expanding
the current program to include business continuity training and creating red flag/identity
theft procedures the people aspect of the Holistic IT audit program proved to be very
efficient. Other areas identified through the analysis were actually protecting the IT
assets from potential malicious attacks such as shoulder surfing and simple acceptable
use banners. All of these provide better and improved overall security posture for the
institutions, both from a physical and training perspective.
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c. How does implementing the Holistic IT Audit framework impact
resources needed to complete the audit compared to other frameworks?
Investigating the resources needed for conducting the IT audit, assuming the
institution already has a framework in place, is significant. From the data analysis, it can
be seen that conducting this audit requires minimal resources from the organization.
However, cost is higher than conducting a short term internal IT audit. When an
institution is conducting internal audits, very little cost is imposed on the organization, as
no specialized consultants need to be on staff. However, when performing the same IT
audit internally, cost of software, training, and education needs must be taken into
consideration. Because SMEFI are generally located in rural areas, another factor of
costs includes travel expenses when internal auditors need to get training to perform these
audits. In addition, employees will not be able to perform regular duties while attending
training. In the long run, both resources and costs may decrease, but further investigation
is needed to determine this. Perhaps the greatest benefit to the institution is that the
framework is based on proven theory, and that all areas of the organization (People,
Operations, Technology) are audited and will ensure a sense of safety, in particular as it
relates to regulatory examinations.
Furthermore, the resources needed for this audit are fewer than those of current
frameworks designed for large organizations. The Holistic IT Audit Framework is
specifically designed for SMEFIs and will improve the overall information security
posture.
This concludes the artifact design portion of this research. A holistic IT audit
framework has been developed based on current frameworks, regulatory requirements,
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and the Defense-in-Depth theory. The artifact has been implemented and validated
through a multiple-case study analysis and these results have been analyzed to verify the
artifacts integrity. Chapter 5 summarizes the research and describes future research
opportunities.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
This research had the following goals:
1.

Identify shortcomings of existing IT audit frameworks, in particular how they
relate to small- and medium-sized financial institutions;

2.

Develop a holistic comprehensive risk-based IT audit framework, incorporating
Defense-in-Depth, specifically designed for small- and medium-sized financial
institution, based on current research and methods;

3.

Test and evaluate the model.
A thorough literature review discovered several issues with current IT audit

frameworks, including the fact that none of them are designed especially for SMEFIs.
All are large frameworks, making an implementation extremely costly and timeconsuming. In addition, it is generally left for banks to decipher what should be audited
and implemented regarding the size and complexity of the organization. Furthermore,
none of the frameworks is considered risk-based, as none is focused on the IT risk
assessment. A sound risk-based IT audit should always be based on a comprehensive
risk assessment methodology. This will ensure that audit resources are focused on the
institution’s critical assets.
Based on a hybrid between current frameworks, regulatory requirements, and the
Defense-in-Depth theory, the researcher developed a Holistic IT Audit Framework
specifically designed for small- and medium-sized financial institutions. The research
suggests that the IT audit has five core areas/steps that need to be included to comply
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with the requirements—Risk-Assessment, Compliance, Vulnerability Assessment,
Penetration Testing, and Social Engineering. The initial step is to base the IT audit on an
IT risk assessment, checking controls for IT assets. The second step is to conduct
research about the institution, learn about the processes the organization has in place, and
to determine where they need to go. This step is strictly focusing on policies and
procedures. The Social Engineering assessment audits the employees of the organization
and also provides good training.
Testing and evaluating the model was completed in two financial institutions.
Both implementations were successful, although it was somewhat difficult to satisfy the
three goals of the implementation. This was the institutions’ first external IT audit that
utilized a framework. However, feedback from regulators was quite positive.
Future Research
Though most of this research is successful, certain improvements can be made.
To further show the success of this research, more case studies should be conducted.
This will enable the researcher to make some generalizability statements. Critical
questions are: Can the IT audit framework be successfully implemented in ANY SMEFI?
Does it work for other industries?
The researcher would also like to make the risk management process more
available and more scientific. Since the risk management process utilized in this research
is proprietary, it is necessary to look at other solutions to actually build the entire
framework for any institution to implement. The purpose of such a study is to
incorporate and map threats and controls based on the Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) and the National Institute of Standards and
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Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-53. Dr. Engebretson, an Information
Security specialist, has researched NIST 800-53 (National Institute of Standards) controls
and CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification) threats and
mapped these controls to each other. This could be valuable information to include in the
risk assessment process to make it more scientific. The researcher would like to
investigate Engebretson’s results further to see if this could be incorporated into the
Holistic IT Audit Framework. The mappings done by Engebretson are extremely
important for a future study to enable the researcher to develop threats and controls
specific to IT systems utilized by financial institutions. The outcome of these mappings
will determine if the data can be utilized for a Risk-Based IT Auditing Standard for all
small- and medium-sized financial institutions.
The second goal of this research is to develop a standard questionnaire set that
outlines all the requirements for banks and financial institutions, ensuring that all areas
will be audited, not simply controls based on the Risk Management process. To ensure
that these questions are risk-based as well, a rating scheme will be developed, ensuring
that areas considered more important are audited more often and more rigorously than
less critical areas. This question set will be based on the FFIEC IT Handbook and
Financial Institutions Letters (FILs) required to be in place at small- and medium-sized
financial institutions.
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Appendix A: SMERAM Risk Assessment Example
SMERAM Risk Assessment Process
1. Inventory assets, vendors, and
service providers

4. Determine Inherent Risk.
Which assets represent risk to the
bank?

7. Demonstrate compliance,
reporting, improve the process

2. Develop priorities, protection
profile (Confidentiality, Integrity,
Availability-Volume)

5. System Controls. What
system safeguards does the bank
want to implement?

8. Organizational Controls. What
safeguards does the bank want to
implement?

3. Identify Threats. What are the
threats to each asset?

6. Determine Residual Risk.
What is the risk after applying
controls?

9. Document Information
Security Program and establish an
effective set of IT policies

SMERAM Controls for Data Loss Threat
Threats and Controls for Core Banking System
Threat:

Control:

Data Loss

Threats and Controls for Web Server
Threat:

Control:

Data Loss
Security Information and Event Management

H

Unique User Accounts

H

Security Information and Event
Management
Data Loss Prevention

M

Activity Logs

H

Activity Logs

M

Activity Log Monitoring

L

Acceptable Use Notification

L

Acceptable Use Notification

M

Data Loss Prevention

M

Website Filtering

M

Unique User Accounts

L

Firewall: Egress Filtering

H

H

M-H

Activity Log Monitoring
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Appendix B: IT Audit Work Paper Example
Threats and Controls for Core
Banking System
Threat:
Data
Loss

Method of Audit

Request
Information

The Bank has
acquired software
(GFI Events
Manager) to
monitor and
report security
events on the
CBS. However,
the software has
not yet been
installed.
All user accounts
on the CBS are
considered
unique. They
consist of the first
four letters of last
name, the twodigit start month,
and two- digit
start year.

Physical Check

H
Unique User
Accounts

Physical Check

H
Activity Logs

Documentation

M
Acceptable Use
Notification
Data Loss Prevention

M
Threats and Controls for Web
Server
Threat:
Data
Loss

H

Notes

Exception /
Recommenda
tion

Physical Check
Physical Check

Control:

Security Information
and Event
Management

The Bank
should, in a
timely
manner,
install and
implement
the SIEM
software
acquired.

1

NA

Physical Check

Activity Log
Monitoring

M

Adequacy

Control:

Security Information
and Event
Management

M

Compliance

Physical Check

CBS Activity Logs
and documentation

The Bank is
monitoring the
activity logs on a
needs basis. No
formal process
and
documentation
exist to support
the bank’s
Logging and
Monitoring
Program.

The Bank
should create
a formal
process to
ensure that
activity logs
are reviewed
and
monitored on
a regular
basis.

1
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H
H

Data Loss Prevention

NA

Activity Logs

Physical Check

Activity Log
Monitoring

Documentation

M-H
M
M
M
L

Acceptable Use
Notification
Website Filtering
Unique User
Accounts
Firewall: Egress
Filtering

NA
Physical Check
NA
Physical Check

Web Server
Activity Logs and
documentation
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Appendix C: IT Audit Questionnaire

Identifier
1.0.1

IT Audit Compliance Questionnaire and Work Papers
Question
Section
Sub-Section
Has an Information Security Program
01) Management
00) Management
(ISP) been implemented?

1.0.2

Are employee and management roles and
responsibilities documented?

01) Management

00) Management

1.0.3

Does the Board of Directors oversee
information security activities and
maintenance?

01) Management

00) Management

1.1.1

Is there an Information Technology (IT)
Committee?

01) Management

01) IT
Management

1.1.2

Does the IT Committee review all
reports generated through the ISP?

01) Management

01) IT
Management

1.1.3

Does the bank have an Information
Security Officer?

01) Management

01) IT
Management

1.1.4

Is the ISO responsible for the day-to-day
implementation and management of the
ISP?
Does the ISO hold a management
position?
Does the ISO have sufficient knowledge,
background, and training to perform job
requirements?

01) Management

01) IT
Management

01) Management

01) IT
Management

01) Management

01) IT
Management

01) Management

02)
Organizational
Chart

01) Management

02)
Organizational
Chart

01) Management

02)
Organizational
Chart

01) Management

03) IT Insurance

01) Management

04) IT Planning

02) Risk
Management
Program

00) Risk
Management
Program

02) Risk
Management
Program

01) Risk
Assessment

1.1.5
1.1.6

1.2.1

1.2.2

1.2.3

1.3.1

1.4.1

Does an accurate and up-to-date
organizational chart exist?
Does the organizational chart include the
Board of Directors and a management
hierarchy?
Does the organizational chart include the
employee roles / titles?
Does the bank have insurance to mitigate
the residual risk of threats to information
and IT systems that the bank does not
have the ability to control or that could
result in significant financial loss to the
bank?
Does the bank maintain an Information
Technology (IT) Strategic Plan?

2.0.1

Does the bank identify and assess risks to
information and IT systems?

2.1.1

Are risk assessments conducted on a
reoccurring basis? Please enter the date
of the last risk assessment in the
comments box.

Compliance

Adequacy
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2.1.2

Does the risk assessment identify and
prioritize risk exposure?

2.2.1

Does management prioritize the findings
of the risk assessment and determine
which recommendations will be
implemented and which risks will be
accepted?
Does the bank require the completion of
a risk-based IT audit (internal and/or
outsourced)?

3.0.1

3.1.1

Are IT audits required at least annually?

3.1.2

Have the scope and schedule of IT audits
been defined?

3.1.3

Are the risk assessment results used to
formulate the IT audit scope and
schedule?
Does the bank have an IT audit
committee?
Has an internal IT auditor been
designated?
Is the internal IT auditor experienced in
the IT functions audited?

3.2.1
3.3.1
3.3.2

02) Risk
Management
Program

01) Risk
Assessment

02) Risk
Management
Program

02) Risk
Assessment
Reports

03) IT Audit
Program

00) IT Audit
Program

03) IT Audit
Program
03) IT Audit
Program

01) Scope and
Schedule
01) Scope and
Schedule

03) IT Audit
Program

01) Scope and
Schedule

03) IT Audit
Program
03) IT Audit
Program
03) IT Audit
Program

02) IT Audit
Committee
03) Internal IT
Audit
03) Internal IT
Audit

3.3.3

Is the internal IT auditor independent
from the IT functions audited?

03) IT Audit
Program

03) Internal IT
Audit

3.3.4

Does the internal IT auditor receive
training in the IT functions audited?

03) IT Audit
Program

03) Internal IT
Audit

3.4.1

Does the bank outsource the IT audit
function? This outsourced IT audit
function may complement or fully
replace the internal IT audit function.

03) IT Audit
Program

04) Outsourced
IT Audit

Does the bank require outsourced IT
audit engagement letters to include
scope, timeframe, and cost of services?

03) IT Audit
Program

04) Outsourced
IT Audit

3.5.1

Are minimum requirements set for IT
audit coverage?

03) IT Audit
Program

05) Audit
Coverage

3.5.2

Did the most recent IT audit include an
assessment of the IT organizational
structure including separation of duties?

03) IT Audit
Program

05) Audit
Coverage

Did the most recent IT audit verify
compliance with policy and procedure
controls?

03) IT Audit
Program

05) Audit
Coverage

Did the most recent IT audit include
adequacy recommendations to improve
IT policies?

03) IT Audit
Program

05) Audit
Coverage

3.5.5

Did the most recent IT audit verify
compliance with GLBA section 501(b)?

03) IT Audit
Program

05) Audit
Coverage

3.6.1

Do IT audit reports contain
recommendations for corrective actions
to be taken?

03) IT Audit
Program

06) Audit
Reports

3.4.2

3.5.3

3.5.4
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3.6.2

3.6.3

4.1.1

4.2.1

4.3.1

Are IT audit conclusions based on the
findings of the auditor(s) with no
intervention from other bank employees?
Does management prioritize the IT audit
recommendations and determine the
actions to be taken to correct the
deficiencies?
Are vulnerability assessments conducted
on a reoccurring basis? Please enter the
date of the last vulnerability assessment
in the comments box.
Are penetration tests conducted on a
reoccurring basis? Please enter the date
of the last penetration test in the
comments box.
Do network security assessment reports
(e.g., vulnerability assessment report,
penetration testing report, etc.) include a
description of the scope and systems
assessed?

03) IT Audit
Program

06) Audit
Reports

03) IT Audit
Program

06) Audit
Reports

04) Network
Security
Assessment
Program

01) Vulnerability
Assessment

04) Network
Security
Assessment
Program

02) Penetration
Testing

04) Network
Security
Assessment
Program

03) Network
Security
Assessment
Reports

04) Network
Security
Assessment
Program

03) Network
Security
Assessment
Reports

4.3.2

Do network security assessment reports
include recommendations for corrective
actions?

4.3.3

Does management prioritize the findings
of the network security assessments and
determine which recommendations will
be implemented and which risks will be
accepted?

04) Network
Security
Assessment
Program

03) Network
Security
Assessment
Reports

5.0.1

In general, does the bank take steps to
protect IT systems and processes?

05) Internal Control
Program

00) Internal
Control Program

5.1.1

Does the bank have a program to provide
management direction and support in the
area of personnel security?

05) Internal Control
Program

01) Personnel
Security
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

01) Personnel
Security
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

01) Personnel
Security
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

01) Personnel
Security
Program

5.1.2

5.1.3

5.1.4

Does the bank verify job application
information for all new employees (e.g.,
character references, experience,
education, qualifications, identity, and
background)?
Does the bank conduct screening of all
personnel, both potential and current
employees, according to the level of risk
associated with their positions?
Does the bank document job
responsibilities for all positions that
clearly outline the expectations of both
the employee and the bank?
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5.1.5

5.10.1

5.10.2

5.11.1

5.12.1

5.12.2

5.12.3

Does the bank have employees sign a
confidentiality and non-disclosure
agreements to prohibit information
sharing or disclosure beyond the scope of
the employees' job responsibilities?

05) Internal Control
Program

01) Personnel
Security
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

10) Patch
Management
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

10) Patch
Management
Program

Is encryption utilized on high-risk
systems that process, store, and transmit
restricted information?

05) Internal Control
Program

11) Encryption

Is there a program in place to provide
management direction and support in the
area of physical security?

05) Internal Control
Program

12) Physical
Security
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

12) Physical
Security
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

12) Physical
Security
Program

Is there a program/schedule in place for
regularly identifying and applying
vendor-supplied updates or patches to
systems?
Are patches and updates tested on nonproduction systems before the patch or
update is installed institution-wide?

Are there security controls for the
building and its secure areas that provide
physical security to confidential
information and to critical IT functions?
Is physical security provided for
equipment within the bank by evaluating
the placement, power supply, cabling,
maintenance, and disposal needs?

5.13.1

Is there a program in place to manage
assets and information within the bank?

5.13.2

Is an inventory of IT assets maintained?

5.13.3

Is the asset inventory up-to-date?

5.13.4

Are physical assets labeled with an
identifying label?

5.13.5

Does the bank have asset acquisition
procedures?

5.13.6

Does the bank have asset tracking
procedures?

5.13.7

Does the bank have a network diagram?

5.13.8

Is the network diagram up-to-date?

5.13.9

Is information classified in terms of
value, sensitivity, and/or criticality?

05) Internal Control
Program
05) Internal Control
Program
05) Internal Control
Program
05) Internal Control
Program
05) Internal Control
Program
05) Internal Control
Program
05) Internal Control
Program
05) Internal Control
Program
05) Internal Control
Program

13) Asset
Management
Program
13) Asset
Management
Program
13) Asset
Management
Program
13) Asset
Management
Program
13) Asset
Management
Program
13) Asset
Management
Program
13) Asset
Management
Program
13) Asset
Management
Program
13) Asset
Management
Program
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5.14.1

Are maintenance logs that track changes
made to information system assets
documented and maintained?

05) Internal Control
Program

14) Maintenance
Logging
Program

Does the bank have processing controls
over preparation, input, and processing
of sensitive information?

05) Internal Control
Program

02) Processing
Control Program

5.3.1

Are all employees required to read and
sign an Acceptable Use policy (AUP)?

05) Internal Control
Program

03) Acceptable
Use

5.3.2

Does the AUP define clear desk and
clear screen requirements?

05) Internal Control
Program

03) Acceptable
Use

5.3.3

Does the AUP define procedures for
enforcement and disciplinary actions?

05) Internal Control
Program

03) Acceptable
Use

5.4.1

Does the bank conduct security
awareness training of security
weaknesses and emerging issues
reoccurring basis? Please enter the date
of the last training event in the comments
box.
Are information security policies
reviewed and discussed with all
employees on a reoccurring basis?

05) Internal Control
Program

04) Security
Awareness
Education
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

04) Security
Awareness
Education
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

05) Social
Engineering
Assessments

05) Internal Control
Program

05) Social
Engineering
Assessments

5.2.1

5.4.4

5.5.1

5.5.2

Does the bank conduct social
engineering testing on a reoccurring
basis? Please enter the date of the last
social engineering assessment in the
comments box.
Do your social engineering tests include
at least one of the following: physical
impersonation, pretext calling, dumpster
diving, shoulder surfing, phishing and
pharming attacks, and handling of
unidentified removable media?

5.5.3

Does the bank review social engineering
test results with employees?

5.6.1

Is all sensitive information sanitized or
destroyed after its useful life has
expired?

5.7.1

5.7.10

5.7.11

Does the bank have a program for
controlling logical access to IT systems?
Logical access refers to user based
authenticated access to systems and the
data that is processed.

05) Internal Control
Program
05) Internal Control
Program

05) Social
Engineering
Assessments
06) Information
Sanitation and
Disposal
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program

Is system access temporarily disabled
when a user is absent for an extended
period of time?

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program

Is all system access removed
immediately when a user permanently
leaves employment?

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program
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5.7.2

Does the bank have an enrollment
process in place to add new users to
system resources?

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program

Are all accounts and permissions
reviewed on a reoccurring basis to ensure
proper access levels?

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program

Does the bank have a process for
updating access rights based on
personnel or system changes?

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program

Are usernames and passwords composed
in a secure and consistent manner that
minimizes risk to the bank's systems?

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program

5.7.7

Are accounts disabled after a consecutive
number of failed login attempts?

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program

5.7.8

Are session controls used to terminate
and/or lock accounts according to
specified periods of time?

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program

05) Internal Control
Program

07) Access
Control Program

05) Internal Control
Program

08) System
Logging and
Monitoring
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

09) Malicious
Software
Protection
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

09) Malicious
Software
Protection
Program

5.7.3

5.7.4

5.7.5

5.7.6

5.7.9

5.8.1

5.9.1

5.9.2

5.9.3

5.9.4

6.0.1

Are account access levels restricted to
minimal resources necessary? Meaning,
are employees limited only to resources
and information that they need to
perform their job functions?

Are appropriate controls in place for
external connectivity (remote access) if
third parties or out-of-office employees
are allowed to connect to the bank?
Does the bank maintain and monitor
system logs for IT and security events.
For example, system logs, access logs,
activity logs, and firewall logs?
Is there an anti-malware program
(software, employee education, etc.) in
place to protect the bank from malicious
software like spyware, viruses, trojans,
worms, etc?
Does the anti-malware program include
software on all workstations, portable
computers, servers, and applicable
network devices?
Are all applicable systems scheduled for
periodic malware scans?

Are the software definition files updated
on a regular basis for the bank's antimalware software?
Is there a program in place to manage
service providers, purchasing of
hardware and software from vendors,
outsourcing, and internal development of
systems?

05) Internal Control
Program

05) Internal Control
Program

06) Development,
Acquisition, and
Oversight Program

09) Malicious
Software
Protection
Program
09) Malicious
Software
Protection
Program
00)
Development,
Acquisition, and
Oversight
Program

93

6.1.1

Is there a program in place to oversee the
internal development of
systems/applications?

06) Development,
Acquisition, and
Oversight Program

01) Systems
Development

6.2.1

Is proper due diligence performed when
selecting service providers?

06) Development,
Acquisition, and
Oversight Program

02) Vendor and
Service Provider
Selection

6.3.1

Does the bank analyze contracts with
third parties to ensure they define the
rights and responsibilities of both the
bank and the service provider?

06) Development,
Acquisition, and
Oversight Program

03) Vendor and
Service Provider
Contract
Requirements

6.4.1

Does the bank perform the necessary
service provider oversight to ensure that
ongoing relationships remain viable?

06) Development,
Acquisition, and
Oversight Program

04) Vendor and
Service Provider
Management

6.5.1

Does the bank outsource management
and control of some or all IT systems,
networks, and/or desktop environments?

06) Development,
Acquisition, and
Oversight Program

05) Outsourced
Services

06) Development,
Acquisition, and
Oversight Program

05) Outsourced
Services

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

01) Identity
Theft Prevention
Program

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

01) Identity
Theft Prevention
Program

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

01) Identity
Theft Prevention
Program

6.5.2

7.1.1

7.1.2

7.1.3

Does the bank have contracts in place
that address the risks, security controls,
and procedures for the outsourced
systems?
Does the bank have an identity theft
prevention program to detect, prevent,
and mitigate identity theft of covered
accounts (FDIC FIL-100-2007) which
are used for personal, family, or
household purposes that permit multiple
payments or transactions.
Does the identity theft prevention
program include processes for
identifying, detecting, and responding to
red flags?
In the identity theft prevention program,
are suspicious address change requests
verified by notifying the customer at
their former address or through other
forms of communication?

7.2.1

Does the bank have an incident response
plan (IRP)?

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

02) Incident
Response
Program

7.2.2

Does the IRP include appropriate
escalation procedures to address varying
alerts or incidents?

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

02) Incident
Response
Program

7.2.3

Has an incident response team (IRT)
been established to address incidents?

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

02) Incident
Response
Program

7.2.4

Are there procedures in place for
reporting suspected crimes and computer
intrusions on Suspicious Activity
Reports (SARs)?

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

02) Incident
Response
Program
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7.3.1

Does the bank have a disaster recovery
plan that will protect the safety of people
and limit damage to the bank?

7.3.2

Is a business continuity plan in place for
resuming the bank's essential business
functions?

7.3.3

Has a business impact analysis been
performed to prioritize the bank's
business functions?

7.3.4

Is a list of non-IT items needed for
normal business functions maintained in
case of a disaster?

7.3.5

Is the business continuity plan and/or
disaster recovery plan kept up-to-date
and are employees trained and aware of
their role in implementation?

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

03) Business
Continuity
Management
Program

Is the business continuity plan and/or
disaster recovery plan tested? Please
enter the date of the most recent test in
the comments box.

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

03) Business
Continuity
Management
Program

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

04) Pandemic
Influenza
Program

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

04) Pandemic
Influenza
Program

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

04) Pandemic
Influenza
Program

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

04) Pandemic
Influenza
Program

7.3.6

7.4.1

Does the bank have a documented
Pandemic Influenza Plan?

7.4.2

Are procedures included in the Pandemic
Influenza Plan to reduce the likelihood
that the bank’s operations will be
significantly affected by a pandemic
event?
Does the Pandemic Influenza Plan
provide scaling of the bank’s pandemic
efforts as conditions of the pandemic
vary?
Does the Pandemic Influenza Plan
include countermeasures (additional
systems, policies, and procedures) for
addressing reductions in available
workforce? Such items could include
social distancing to reduce human
contact, telecommuting; promote use of
drive-up window and Internet Banking,
or conducting operations from alternative
sites.

7.4.3

7.4.4

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program
07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program
07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program
07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

03) Business
Continuity
Management
Program
03) Business
Continuity
Management
Program
03) Business
Continuity
Management
Program
03) Business
Continuity
Management
Program

7.4.5

Is the Pandemic Influenza Plan tested?
Please enter the date of the most recent
test in the comments box.

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

04) Pandemic
Influenza
Program

7.4.6

Is the Pandemic Influenza Plan,
including supporting policies, standards,
and procedures, kept up-to-date?

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

04) Pandemic
Influenza
Program
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7.5.1

7.5.2

7.5.3

7.5.4

7.5.5

7.5.6

8.0.1

Is mission critical information backed up
on a regular basis. Mission critical
information can include: master files of
customer information; critical business
databases, files, and programs; operating
systems; and customized security
settings files.

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

05) Data Backup
Program

Are backups rotated off-site at the end of
each processing day to ensure the most
recent data is stored off-site at all times?

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

05) Data Backup
Program

Are backups, both on-site and off-site,
stored in a secure location providing
protection from unauthorized access and
environmental hazards such as fire,
water, etc?

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

05) Data Backup
Program

Does the alternative backup site have the
hardware and software necessary to
support the restoration of critical
information and system program files?

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

05) Data Backup
Program

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

05) Data Backup
Program

Are backup systems and procedures
tested on a reoccurring basis? This
includes testing the backup data and
media for integrity.

07) Emergency
Preparedness
Program

05) Data Backup
Program

Does management report the status of the
ISP and compliance with GLBA 501(b)
guidelines to the Board of Directors?

08) Reviews and
Evaluations

00) Reviews and
Evaluations

Is backup media encrypted during transit
and storage?
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Appendix D: Physical IT Audit Assessment
Social Engineering / Physical Assessment
Physical Impersonation
Approach the Bank with no name tag or identifier; ask to take a look around. Verify what
vendors are required to do as well as if the work is authorized by the ISO.
Perimeter
Are employee monitors visible from windows and doors?
Are employee documents visible from windows and doors?
Are non-customer entrances secured?
Is the building structure secure and sound?
Are external windows locked?
Is critical IT equipment visible from windows and doors?
Are there unsecured access points between other buildings?

Main Entrance
Is there a visitor/vendor sign-in sheet?
Are visitor/vendors required to wear badges?
Are there physical barrier between customer and bank areas?
Are all entrances monitored by employees?

Data Center / Network Areas
Are important assets consolidated into data centers for easier protection?
Are drop ceilings or raised floors in the data center or other areas that house critical IT equipment
secured against access?
Do environmental controls (heating, cooling, humidity) exist which can maintain consistent IT
equipment operating temperature?
Are there signs denoting secured areas?
Are there signs restricting food and beverage?
Are unattended secure areas locked?
Is critical IT equipment located a safe distance from water?
Are areas that house critical IT equipment equipped with fire detection and suppression?
Is critical IT equipment located on stable platform?
Is critical IT equipment located in locked area/rack/cage?
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Is critical IT equipment run through UPSs and/or a backup generator?
Are network and power cables located in secure locations?
Are unused ports on switches/routers or on walls disabled or secured?

General Areas
Is there video surveillance?
Is there a motion detection alert system?
Do unattended offices have clear desks?
Do unattended computers have clear screens?
Are computer monitors securely positioned?
Are easily removable storage devices and media anchored down?
Is critical IT information located in trash cans?
Is there any wireless network technology implemented?
Are delivered materials handled in a secure manner?
Is general equipment safe from theft?
Are locked covers or plugs used to protect media access ports (USB, CD drives, etc)?
Are media ports easily accessible to the public?
Are any customer areas located in obscure areas?
Are office printers located near customer areas?
Are wiring closets securely locked?

Other Checks
Talk with customer to determine if there are any additional physical checks they would like
performed.
Offer to take a sampling of the asset inventory and compare it against the actual assets at each
location.
Perform a general assessment of physical storage used to house paper documents and electronic media
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Appendix E: Qualitative Data Analysis
Category

Measure Training
Level

Comments

Institution

Method of Evidence

The Bank should develop a Security Awareness
Program that requires the Bank to hold annual
training for employees. The training should
include social engineering, malware awareness,
acceptable use, the Information Security
Program, and other current information security
topics.

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

The Bank should consider adding dates for
when organizational charts are updated and
changes are made. This will ensure that only
the most recent copy is utilized.

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank X

IT Audit Report

Great learning experience conducting the audit;
many interesting findings and discoveries about
the organization as well as suggestions to
improve overall security

Bank X

Post-Assessment

The Bank should document a personnel security
program that ensures the following for new
hires to comply with its ISP:

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank X

IT Audit Report

The Bank should consider adding Pandemic
Preparedness scenarios to its annual Emergency
Preparedness Testing efforts. This will ensure
that the plan is accurate and current.

Identify Areas of
Risk

The Bank should consider updating its Risk
Assessment process to include specific threats
and controls to each asset. Applying threats
and controls to each asset will ensure that more
critical assets have adequate controls in place.

The Bank should consider implementing
procedures on how to remove terminated
employee access. Ensuring that access is
removed will prevent unauthorized access for
personnel no longer employed at the Bank.
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The Bank should consider documenting what
supplies should be on hand, such as surgical
masks, hand sanitizer, and sneeze guards etc.
In addition, the Bank should consider updating
its plan to include planning for workforce
reduction and rotation schedules.

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank X

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

The Bank should review all monitor positions
to ensure that they cannot be seen from any
angle, including windows. If screens can be
seen from different angles, the Bank should
consider privacy screens, or decide if possible
monitors should be rearranged to eliminate this
issue.

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Great learning experience conducting the audit.
Many interesting findings and discoveries about
the organization as well as suggestions to
improve overall security

Bank X

Post-Assessment

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

The Bank should consider implementing a
formal third-party vendor management process
on all of its critical vendors
The Bank should consider updating its Incident
Response Program to include specific threats
such as Internet Banking, Robbery, and
Viruses, etc.
Furthermore, procedures for
these incidents should be developed.

The Bank should consider implementing unique
and separate authentication methods to its Proof
Machine. Ensuring unique usernames and
passwords will ensure that access to systems is
only granted to authorized personnel.

The Bank should consider implementing unique
and separate authentication methods to its Proof
Machine. Ensuring unique usernames and
passwords will ensure that access to systems is
only granted to authorized personnel.
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The Bank should consider developing an
Emergency Preparedness Test Plan.
The
objective of an Emergency Preparedness Test
Plan is to ensure that the emergency
preparedness plans remain accurate, relevant,
and operable under adverse conditions. Testing
should include applications and business
functions that were identified during the IT
Risk Assessment process.

Ban X

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

The Bank should consider adding procedures
that help identify information systems and what
type of information has been compromised,
such as physical theft.

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

The Bank should consider on an annual basis to
review its Security Awareness Training
Program to determine its adequacy and if
further training is necessary. Furthermore, a
report of the findings, topics covered, and a list
of who attended should be given to the Board
for review on an annual basis.

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

The Bank should consider adding Pandemic
Preparedness scenarios to its annual Emergency
Preparedness Testing efforts. This will ensure
that the plan is accurate and current.

Bank X

IT Audit Report

Because the Physical Assessment was such an
eye opener for the institution, they will keep
conducting the same type of assessment on an
annual basis

Bank X

Post-Assessment

Inactive Lockout Policy on the domain
controller: Inactive lockout is when users are
locked out of the system after a set period of
time. The Bank should set this policy on the
domain controller, not on individual systems.

Training
Suggestions
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The Bank should consider documenting what
supplies should be on hand, such as surgical
masks, hand sanitizer, and sneeze guards etc.
In addition, the Bank should consider updating
its plan to include planning for workforce
reduction and rotation schedules.

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

Post-Assessment

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

The Bank should consider implementing a
formal third party vendor management process
on all of its critical vendors

Bank X

IT Audit Report

Great learning experience conducting the audit.
Many interesting findings and discoveries about
the organization as well as suggestions to
improve overall security.

Bank X

Post-Assessment

The Bank should consider addressing
recommendations from previous audits on a
timely
manner.
Furthermore,
these
recommendations should be tracked, utilizing
the Bank’s exceptions tracking process. This
process should include timeframes for when
these exceptions should be implemented.

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Did not have a framework in place. Did some
policy compliance audits, but it did not satisfy
regulators.

Bank Y

Pre-Assessment

The bank previously only completed some
internal auditing. No framework was utilized.

Bank X

Pre-Assessment

Examiners wanted more details, covering
additional areas.

Bank X

Examiners

The institution has put Social Engineering in
their strategic planning for 2010. As long as
the Board approves the assessment, it will
continue doing such assessments

The Bank should consider updating its Incident
Response Program to include specific threats
such as Internet Banking, Robbery, and Viruses
etc.
Furthermore, procedures for these
incidents should be developed.

Framework too
large for
Organization size
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Not covering IT, system controls, and not based
on a framework for SMEFIs.
The OCC specifically asked the bank to
conduct annual penetration tests, vulnerability
assessments, and external IT auditing. The
OCC also required the IT audit to be risk-based.

Prior to this IT Audit, regulators required the
institution to expand its IT audit program to
cover IT assets, policy, VA, PT, SE, regulatory
compliance. The audit should also be done by
an external entity and be risk-based.

Furthermore, the Bank should consider
expanding its IT Audit Program to include
details on what should be audited and how
frequently.

Organization
Awareness Lacking

The organization should consider implementing
formal discussions and formal documentation
of any reports generated out of the Information
Security Program. These reports may include:
Risk Assessment, IT Audit Program and
Reports, Internal Control Programs, Emergency
Preparedness, etc.

The Bank should consider creating a Risk
Assessment specifically designed for its Red
Flag Identity Theft Program.
Such an
assessment should apply threats and controls to
the different methods of opening accounts.
This will ensure that procedures are created,
appropriate controls are applied.

The Bank should consider documenting what
supplies should be on hand, such as surgical
masks, hand sanitizer, and sneeze guards etc.
In addition, the Bank should consider updating
its plan to include planning for workforce
reduction and rotation schedules.

Bank Y

Examiners

Bank X

Examiners

Bank Y

Examiners

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report
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The Bank should consider reviewing and
monitoring domain logs. To assist in this
effort, the Bank should consider implementing
a Security and Event Management (SIEM)
solution (software).

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank X

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank X
and Bank
Y

IT Audit Report

Bank X

Pre-Assessment

Bank Y did not do any type of IT auditing prior
to implementing the Holistic IT Audit
Framework. Therefore this fell outside of the
scope of the post-assessment

Bank Y

Pre-Assessment

Bank X and Bank Y were both required to
complete external IT audits. Included in these
recommendations were penetration testing and
vulnerability assessments.

Bank X
and Bank
Y

Interview

Bank X
and Bank
Y

PostAssessment/Previous
Regulatory Report

The Bank should consider implementing
procedures on how to remove terminated
employee access. Ensuring that access is
removed will prevent unauthorized access for
personnel no longer employed at the Bank.

Inactive Lockout Policy on the domain
controller: Inactive lockout is when users are
locked out of the system after a set period of
time. The Bank should set this policy on the
domain controller, not on individual systems.

An Acceptable Use Notification is a screen that
appears before you log into the domain
notifying the user on the acceptable use of the
Bank’s systems. Before continuing, the user
must click ―OK‖.

Not part of scoping

Cost

Bank X did some internal IT auditing prior to
implementing the holistic IT Audit Framework.
However, simple compliance with documented
policy was verified. No compliance with
regulatory requirements was considered.

Cost was not an issue, as the bank was forced
by regulators to conduct external IT Audits.

104

Fewer internal resources needed;

Bank X

Post-Assessment

overall increase in cost to conduct external IT
auditing

Bank X

Post-Assessment

Bank X

PostAssessment/Interview

Because Bank X was previously conducting
internal IT audits, but still was recommended to
conduct an external audit, manpower and
knowledge were the main reasons for this
recommendation. The researcher concluded
that examiners deemed the organization not
capable of doing its own IT auditing as a result
of this.

Bank X

Interview/Previous
Regulatory Report

The institution freed up critical resources that
can now be used elsewhere.

Bank X

Interview

The Bank should consider a risk-rating system
for all of its tracking reports. The rating system
for each finding could be based on HighMedium-Low ratings. Such ratings will assist
the Bank in determining how critical these
findings are, and how quickly they will need to
be addressed.

Bank X

IT Audit Report

No additional training needed for the internal
auditor

Bank X

Interview

The institution did not conduct any type of
audits prior to this audit. The resources needed
from the institution were minimal.

Bank Y

Interview

The main concern before conducting an
external audit was staff knowledge, and as time
went on, IT audits and examiners’ requirements
simply got too complicated.

Bank X

Post-Assessment

Bank Y

Post-Assessment

ISO stated that the external IT audit may be
more costly than internal auditing. However,
ensuring that regulators are comfortable with
the audit work is priceless.

Manpower

Not based on theory, and it was not risk-based
according to regulators. This framework was
risk-based and covered a broad range of issues
and was based on DiD.
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The Bank should consider implementing unique
and separate authentication methods to its Proof
Machine. Ensuring unique usernames and
passwords will ensure that access to systems is
only granted to authorized personnel.

The Bank should consider creating a Risk
Assessment specifically designed for its Red
Flag Identity Theft Program.
Such an
assessment should apply threats and controls to
the different methods of opening accounts.
This will ensure that procedures are created,
appropriate controls are applied.
The Bank should consider documenting what
supplies should be on hand, such as surgical
masks, hand sanitizer, and sneeze guards etc.
In addition, the Bank should consider updating
its plan to include planning for workforce
reduction and rotation schedules.

The Bank should consider implementing an
Acceptable Use Notification on its systems. An
Acceptable Use Notification is a message that
appears before logging into the domain
notifying the user on the acceptable use of the
Bank’s systems. Before continuing, the user
must click ―OK‖.

Inactive Lockout Policy on the domain
controller: Inactive lockout is when users are
locked out of the system after a set period of
time. The Bank should set this policy on the
domain controller, not on individual systems.

Time

ISO stated that the external IT audit did not
take as long as that of the internal auditor.
Specialized auditors know what they are
looking for and therefore, time spent onsite is
considerably less.

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank X

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank X

Interview
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Not based on theory, and it was not risk-based
according to regulators. This framework was
risk-based and covered a broad range of issues
and was based on DiD.

Effectiveness

Bank X

Post-Assessment

Bank Y

Interview

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

Bank Y

IT Audit Report

The bank previously conducted a policy audit,
not risk-based. This is the second IT audit the
bank has conducted, and it covers additional
areas, but also includes policy and regulatory
compliance. Most importantly, it was riskbased.

Bank X

Post-Assessment

The main concern before conducting external
audit was staff knowledge, and as time went on,
IT audits and examiners’ requirements simply
got too complicated.

Bank X

Post-Assessment

Not based on theory, and it was not risk-based
according to regulators. This framework was
risk-based and covered a broad range of issues
and was based on DiD.

Bank X

Post-Assessment

ISO states that conducting external auditing
including such broad topics creates a complete
IT audit.
Inactive Lockout Policy on the domain
controller: Inactive lockout is when users are
locked out of the system after a set period of
time. The Bank should set this policy on the
domain controller, not on individual systems.

The Bank should consider creating a Risk
Assessment specifically designed for its Red
Flag Identity Theft Program.
Such an
assessment should apply threats and controls to
the different methods of opening accounts.
This will ensure that procedures are created,
appropriate controls are applied.
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Appendix F: Cross-Case Synthesis
Institution
1

Characteristics

2

Both institutions are considered small- and medium-sized. One institution has $50
million in is assets while the other has $250 million.
Both institutions are rural and independently owned and operated.

3

Both institution are regulated by the same regulatory body.

Comparison
4

Characteristics
The new Holistic IT Audit model
is more resource effective:
a)

Cost

b)

Manpower

c)

5

Measure Training level

b) Identify Areas of Risk

Results

Interview
(postassessment)
Conducting internal IT audits to
the extent these organizations did
(compliance) did not impose
additional costs for the banks.
Less manpower is needed than that
of specialized consultants used to
implement current frameworks
such as ISO 27002.

Time

The value of the Social
Engineering assessment to the
institution:

a)

Method

Audit results
and postassessment

When comparing it to utilizing
current employees, the manpower
used for the external audit is also
less. No single individual had to
devote time to interview, report
and check.
Because the audit was conducted
externally, time was not an issue.
Ensuring that employees did not
have to attend specialized training
impacted the effectiveness and the
time the institutions spent on
internal audits.
Both Bank X and Bank Y will
continue doing Social Engineering
Assessments as part of their IT
Audit efforts because of the
experience with this assessment as
well as the value of such results.
Doing a physical assessment
(Appendix D) measures the level
of training in the organization. It
assesses the employees as well as
internal policy understanding
The physical assessment
(Appendix D) identified several
areas of risk; shoulder surfing,
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c)

6

Training Suggestions

The Holistic IT Audit Framework
has less regulatory mismatch than
previous model utilized.

a)

Framework too large for
organization size.

b) Organization Awareness
Lacking.

c)

Not part of scoping.

Postassessment
and
regulatory
responses

additional internal policies such as
shredding of documents
Based on the assessment results, a
series of training
recommendations were made.
Both institutions must ensure that
employees are properly trained
Because neither Bank previously
utilized any framework it is
difficult to determine the validity
of less regulatory mismatches.
However, in both cases, the
regulators utilized the IT Audit
Results as their assessment. No
recommendations were made in
the examiner’s report of the IT
Audit, generally a good sign.
Since neither organization utilized
any framework previously, this
cannot be determined by the case
study. However, looking at the
cost and time of implementing
current frameworks, it can be
concluded that these frameworks
are simply not appropriate for
SMEFIs.
Regulators recommended that both
institutions complete external IT
audits, meaning that the
institutions did not have
adequately trained staff to conduct
internal audits. Furthermore,
through the IT audit report, several
areas of improvements were
identified.
Because simple compliance audits
were conducted internally, DiD
was not a part of scoping for either
organization. Encompassing DiD
was only done after regulatory
exams where it was recommended
that the institutions conduct audits
that included PT, VA, and
compliance.

